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ABSTRACT 
 
Federal civil procedure today relies extensively on trial judge discretion to 
manage litigation, promote settlements, and otherwise tailor process to individual 
cases.  Even those rules with decisional standards leave trial judges considerable 
interpretive freedom to make case-specific determinations.  This Article criticizes 
these choices and recommends stricter rules. Many judges and procedure 
scholars applaud the discretionary approach, and the Advisory Committee seems 
content to draft vague rules that implement it. The assumption seems to be that 
trial judges have the expertise and experience to do a good job of tailoring 
procedures to the needs of particular cases. The assumption is wrong, and this 
Article explains why.   
After surveying how discretion operates in federal procedure and explaining 
how it came to dominate, the Article turns to developing the argument against 
case-specific discretion.  It begins by identifying the primary purpose of 
procedure and explains why achieving quality settlements is as important as 
achieving quality judgments. The settlement quality and judgment quality 
objectives conflict, however, and designing procedures to balance them optimally 
is a difficult matter.  The Article then identifies three serious problems that 
frustrate any effort by trial judges to strike an optimal balance in individual 
cases: bounded rationality limits, information access obstacles, and strategic 
interaction effects.  These problems are particularly acute in procedure because 
of the highly strategic nature of litigation and the tightly integrated structure of a 
procedural system. The Article explains why the three problems are not as 
serious for committee-based rulemakers as for trial judges and why the cost-
benefit balance therefore supports adopting stricter rules.  The Article concludes 
by discussing four ways to limit discretion and illustrating each with concrete 
reform proposals in the areas of discovery, settlement promotion, and class action 
law.  
 
 
I. Introduction
 How much discretion should a trial judge have to design procedures for a given 
lawsuit?  This is a difficult and important question for civil proceduralists today.  Federal 
district judges exercise extremely broad and relatively unchecked discretion over many of 
the details of litigation.1  They have extensive power to manage cases, and broad, 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (“Modern procedure has conferred on 
trial court judges broader unreviewed (and perhaps unreviewable) discretion”); Jonathan T. Molot, How 
Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 963 (1998) 
[hereinafter Changes in the Legal Profession]  (“the discretion of trial judges has expanded partly because 
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essentially unreviewable, power to promote settlements.  Even when a procedural rule 
includes decisional standards, those standards often rely on expansive judicial discretion 
to make critical case-specific determinations.2  Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to 
say that federal procedure, especially at the pretrial stage, is largely the trial judge’s 
creation subject to minimal appellate review. 
Many federal judges and procedure scholars favor maintaining and even 
expanding broad case-specific discretion, arguing that trial judges have the necessary 
expertise and experience to tailor procedures to the needs of particular cases.3   More 
skeptical scholars worry about the high costs and the legitimacy and accountability 
 
of increased complexity but even more so from the multiplication of discretionary procedural, evidentiary, 
and management decisions”). 
2  See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1795 
(2002). 
3  See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (retrieving equity as a 
source of procedural discretion); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003) (arguing for broad use of equitable discretion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Complex 
Litigation at the Millenium: Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of 
Discovery “Reform”, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 232-234 (Spring/Summer 2001) (advocating broad 
trial judge discretion to tailor discovery to individual cases); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at 
the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995-96 (1989) (approving trial judge 
discretion limited by “principles of preference” to guard against abuse).  Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Slouching 
Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003) [hereinafter Slouching] (arguing that concerns 
about trial judge discretion are overblown). 
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problems that broad and relatively unchecked discretion can generate.4   The debate has 
even reached a global level. 5
In this Article, I side with the skeptics, but for reasons that have not been fully 
explored before.  Most critics focus on risk of abuse and give short shrift to competency 
concerns.  This is a mistake.  The pervasive assumption that expert trial judges can do a 
good job of tailoring procedures to individual cases is simply wrong.  In fact, judges face 
serious problems choosing case-specific procedures to work well in the highly strategic 
environment of litigation, and these competency problems deserve much more serious 
attention. 
If we were not so accustomed to broad trial judge discretion over procedure, we 
would probably think it a rather strange way to manage the litigation environment.  
Imagine hiring a manager to oversee a workplace where the employees are committed to 
achieving diametrically opposite results, encouraged to pursue their own self interest and 
not the interests of the firm, allowed to use a wide range of strategic tools to achieve their 
objectives, and permitted to conceal critical information from the manager and from one 
another.  Even the best manager is likely to have great difficulty managing such a 
 
4  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L. J. 27 
(2003) [hereinafter Judicial Role] (criticizing modern procedural developments for placing the trial judge in 
a highly discretionary management-type role that exceeds the bounds of judicial competence); Todd D. 
Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 41 (1995) (arguing that the broad discretionary power trial judges have over pre-trial management 
creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary power); Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion 
Over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 297-306 (1991) (criticizing the “trend 
toward overbroad discretion in complex litigation”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) 
[hereinafter Equity] (arguing for stricter and clearer rules to discipline litigation and enhance outcome 
consistency); Judith A. Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 
548 (1986) [hereinafter Failing Faith] (expressing reservations about the trial judge’s ability to exercise 
case-specific discretion fairly). 
5  The topic of procedural discretion was the subject of an international conference held in 2000.  See 
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE JUDGE: LIMITS AND CONTROLS 45 (Marcel Storme & Burkhard Hess, ed. 
2003) (noting a global trend toward broader case-specific discretion over procedure).    
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fractious workplace environment.  Indeed, when we think of an effective manager, we 
think of someone coordinating and inspiring employees hired to work for a common goal 
and usually eager to do so.  The litigation environment, with its adversarial, self-
interested, and strategic elements, is a far cry from this situation. 
This Article carefully examines the efficacy of case-specific discretion, explains 
why general rules are often superior, and urges rulemakers to draft rules with more 
constraints.  The argument begins by identifying the primary purpose of procedure, which 
is to produce a pattern of judgments and settlements that enforces the substantive law’s 
incentive and justice goals optimally.  Producing quality settlements and producing 
quality judgments are equally important objectives in achieving this overall purpose.  
These two objectives conflict, however, and balancing them entails complicated quality 
tradeoffs.  This is significant because trial judges are likely to have special difficulties 
striking an optimal balance on a case-specific basis.  In particular, bounded rationality, 
information access obstacles, and strategic interaction effects frustrate case-specific 
decisionmaking, especially in the highly strategic environment of litigation.  Committee-
based rulemakers are in a better position to evaluate the options and craft stricter rules 
that do a superior job across the class of cases to which they apply.  Accordingly, 
rulemakers should be much more skeptical of delegating discretion to trial judges and 
should seriously consider adopting rules that limit or channel discretion more 
aggressively. 
For example, discretionary control over discovery invites parties to contest 
discovery matters vigorously, which compounds litigation costs and creates opportunities 
for strategic abuse.  As I shall argue, a trial judge with discretion becomes another 
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strategic player in the litigation game, which can increase the costs even further without 
any assurance of better results.  Moreover, the broad discretion that trial judges exercise 
over settlement can make frivolous litigation more attractive and compound agency costs 
when attorneys deviate from their clients’ wishes.  And the lack of normative guidance in 
the class action rule has produced a discretionary regime that in many ways falls short of 
promoting class action goals effectively.  I discuss all of these examples in later sections.  
It is no easy matter to decide on the optimal degree of discretion or create rules to 
achieve it.  Obviously, some measure of discretion is both inevitable and desirable, 
though not the broad discretion judges currently enjoy.  I propose that the Advisory 
Committee justify in explicit terms how much discretion to delegate and in what form.   
In this regard, the Committee should review the various methods for limiting or 
channeling discretion.  This Article discusses and illustrates four such methods, 
proposing concrete reforms to implement each approach: (1) eliminating discretion as 
much as possible with strict rules strictly enforced; (2) narrowing the range of options 
available to the trial judge; (3) channeling discretion by providing factors to balance 
coupled with guidance for assigning weights to the different factors, and (4) articulating 
general principles to help the trial judge make normative judgments among the competing 
adjudicative values at stake.  These four alternatives are ordered from most limiting to 
least limiting, and they are appropriate in different situations. 
The body of this Article is divided into four parts.  Part II defines what is meant 
by procedural discretion and briefly surveys the way discretion operates in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure today.   Part III provides a brief history of how trial judge 
discretion became such a dominant feature of federal civil procedure and offers reasons 
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why it still persists.   Part IV focuses on inherent problems with case-specific discretion – 
in particular, bounded rationality limits, information access obstacles, and strategic 
interaction effects – problems that should shake any naïve confidence in the ability of 
trial judges to exercise discretion well.  Finally, Part V analyzes, with concrete examples, 
each of the four methods of limiting discretion in light of their costs and benefits. 
 II. The Nature of Procedural Discretion 
A. The Concept of Discretion
It would be helpful at the outset to have a clear working definition of procedural 
“discretion.”   Unfortunately, however, the concept is extremely difficult to define.   At 
its core, discretion has to do with the freedom to choose.6  Beyond this, precise definition 
is elusive.  Part of the confusion results from differences of perspective.7  From a 
psychological perspective, discretion refers to a subjective perception or belief on the part 
of a decisionmaker that she has freedom to choose.  From a sociological perspective, 
discretion might refer to an empirically observable regularity in which officials make 
authoritative choices without being checked.  
This Article focuses on the normative perspective.  Roughly speaking, a 
decisionmaker has discretion in a normative sense when she is under no moral or legal 
obligation to make a particular choice and no one can authoritatively demand that she do 
so.  There are degrees of discretion, of course, but they all must leave some zone for the 
                                                 
6  See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) ("the 
power to choose between two or more courses of action, each of which is thought of as permissible"); 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-32 (1978) (distinguishing weak from strong discretion). 
7  See KEITH HAWKINS, THE USES OF DISCRETION 13-19 (1992) (discussing different perspectives). 
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operation of free choice.8  It is also important to bear in mind that a decisionmaker can 
have broad discretion in the normative sense even when there are informal standards to 
criticize her choice and informal sources of guidance.9  In fact, most discretionary 
decisions take place within some guidelines, principles, or constraints.10  For example, a 
trial judge has broad discretion to schedule the starting date for trial, but even a 
reasonable and perfectly valid choice can be criticized for not serving the goals of 
adjudication as well as some other alternative.11  Once extreme or impermissible options 
are excluded, however, no one can object to the choice of trial date on the ground that the 
judge had a duty to decide differently.  
One can question how useful discretion is as an analytical concept.  Perhaps it is 
not discretion itself that matters, but rather what agents actually do with the discretion 
they have.12  For example, critics of case management at times seem less concerned 
 
8  For example, a decision of a preliminary injunction motion is highly discretionary, but the choice 
of a trial date is even more so because there is less law to constrain.  See, e.g., Lawson Products, Inc. v. 
Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1436-39 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that conclusions about irreparable harm, the 
balance of interests, and the probability of success are reviewed under a very generous abuse of discretion 
standard, but the choice of legal standards is reviewed de novo). 
9  See HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 38-44. 
10  When someone has complete freedom to choose based purely on personal preference without any 
constraint, we do not usually refer to this as an exercise of “discretion” – a point Professor Kent Greenawalt 
made some time ago with the example of a child choosing the flavor of ice cream she wants.  Kent 
Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 359, 365 n. 30 (1975). 
11  Indeed, the judge herself has reason to pay attention to these criticisms insofar as they appeal to 
the broader purposes of adjudication.  She might even be persuaded that the choice she made was not the 
best under the circumstances.  Still, the validity of her decision remains undisturbed.    
12  Professor Ed Rubin makes this point about administrative agencies.  Edward L. Rubin, Discretion 
and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).  He argues that a focus on discretion in the abstract 
“contributes nothing to our understanding of the activities involved, and may in fact create unnecessary and 
avoidable confusion,” id. at 1311, by diverting attention from the more subtle ways agency decisions are 
constrained and from the things agencies actually do with the discretion they enjoy.  See id. at 1311-13, 
1317-18. 
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about trial judges excercising discretion in the abstract than about their using discretion to 
manage cases (instead of adjudicate) or promote settlements (instead of conduct trials).13  
There is some merit to this point, but there is also something important to 
understand about procedural discretion in general.  In the strategic environment of 
litigation, trial judge discretion to design case-specific procedures can create serious 
problems.  Although these problems vary with context, they have common features, and 
it is important to understand what those features are and why and how the problems arise. 
B. Procedural Discretion  
Case-specific discretion has been at the heart of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure ever since they were first adopted in 1938.14  There are two main ways 
discretion operates: a Federal Rule might delegate discretion explicitly, or it might 
facilitate discretion indirectly by using intentionally vague language that invites flexible 
interpretation.15    
1. Explicit Discretion 
                                                 
13  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000) [hereinafter Trial as Error]. 
14  See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1795 (“Yet time and again, the Rules adhere to a pervading 
characteristic.  The effort is less to provide detailed controls and more to establish general policies that 
guide discretionary application on a case-specific basis….vast discretion remains at virtually every turn.”); 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 240 (Summer 1998) 
[hereinafter Judging Rules) (“At virtually every stage of the process … the Rules grant judges enormous 
discretion in the conduct and resolution of disputes.”); Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: 
Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
133, 201 (1997) [herinafter Changing Practices] (“The Federal Rules of the 1930s are founded upon 
judicial discretion.”).  One commentator has identified thirty-six distinct Federal Rules that explicitly 
delegate case-specific discretion.  Subrin, Equity, supra note 4, at 923 n.76. 
15  There are three additional sources of discretion.  First, trial judges have inherent discretionary 
power to manage litigation in situations not coveredby statute or Federal Rule, although this power is quite 
limited.   See Link v. Wabash R. R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 
44-45 (1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 1987).  
Second, trial judges have traditional equitable discretion to relieve parties from the apparent injustice of a 
strict rule.  See Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 980, 987 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Third, judges make procedural law by the common law method in areas not covered by statute 
or Federal Rule (although one might not call this discretion depending on how one views common law).  
However, common law procedure aims to generate norms of general application whereas the focus of this 
Article is on the power of trial judges to tailor procedures to the specific circumstances of individual cases. 
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Rule 16 is perhaps the most notable example of a Federal Rule that explicitly 
delegates broad discretion.16   Rule 16 authorizes judges to hold pretrial conferences and 
“take appropriate action” with respect to a wide range of matters, including pleading, 
discovery, settlement, summary judgment, and trial.17  It specifically contemplates broad 
case management and active settlement promotion.18  What limited guidance the Rule 
supplies is cast in terms of highly general goals that offer little constraint, such as 
“expediting the disposition of the action” and “discouraging wasteful pretrial 
activities.”19   
 Discretionary case management extends to the appointment of litigation 
committees in complex cases, sequencing of issues, scheduling of discovery, timing of 
summary judgment and trial, and much more.20  As for settlement promotion, a judge can 
choose from a diverse menu of options depending on her settlement philosophy, 
including offering a preliminary assessment of the merits, interviewing lawyers privately, 
meeting with parties with or without their lawyers, recommending settlement ranges, 
nudging parties and their lawyers in the direction of what the judge believes is a fair 
agreement, and referring cases to court-annexted ADR.21     There are some legal 
 
16  There are many other examples.  To pick just two, Rule 24(b) gives the judge broad discretion to 
allow permissive intervention when the application is “timely” and the intervenor’s “claim or defense and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common,” see 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1913 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL PRACTICE], and Rule 42(b) gives a judge extremely broad discretion to carve up a complicated 
lawsuit into separate trials, see 9 id. § 2388. 
17  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). 
18  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2) (management), 16(a)(5) (settlement); 3 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§§ 16.02, 16.03[1][a] (3d ed. 2002) (“Rule 16 is explicitly intended to encourage active judicial 
management…judges are encouraged to actively participate in designing case-specific plans to position 
litigation as efficiently as possible for disposition by settlement, motion, or trial.”).  
19  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1), (3). 
20  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995).   
21  See, e.g., D.M. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (Federal 
Judicial Center 1986); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 16.55[9]; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra note 20, §§ 23.11-23.13.   Judges can also influence settlement in more indirect ways, 
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constraints, to be sure,22 but they are extremely loose and leave wide room for 
discretionary choice.23
Other Rules delegate discretion but also list factors that a judge must balance 
when making a decision.  Examples include Rule 19(b) on compulsory joinder and Rule 
23(b)(3) on the class action.24   However, the factors listed are usually very general and 
frequently just repeat what any sensible judge would consider anyway.25  Moreover, none 
of these Rules specifies the weights to be assigned to the different factors or tell judges 
 
such as by establishing early and firm trial dates, setting deadlines for discovery, and sequencing discovery 
to focus on the most salient issues first.  See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL 
CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 88-92 (RAND 1996) [hereinafter 
EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT”]. 
22  For example, the Due Process Clause might impose some limits.  See Developments in the Law – 
The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1869-71 (2000).  The Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act limits the types of ADR that a judge can mandate on a case-specific basis in the absence of 
party consent.  See 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (allowing local rules to authorize judges to require ADR without 
party consent only for mediation and early neutral evaluation).  Local Rules also impose limits, but these 
are fairly minimal.  And of course there is some case precedent that constrains or guides the choice among 
settlement and management options.  See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that trial judges have no power under Rule 16 or their inherent powers to order a summary jury 
trial without the parties’ consent).   
23  It is important, however, not to confuse discretion with arbitrary decisionmaking.  District judges 
can find guidance, if they wish it, from case management seminars and manuals and other publications.   
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 20; Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 
(2001); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 13, at 943-49 (describing seminars).  Still, none of these sources 
is binding, and in the end, a trial judge must address the specific circumstances of each particular case, 
which requires a great deal of open-ended discretionary judgment. 
24  Rule 19(b) lists four factors that must be considered by a judge deciding whether to dismiss a 
lawsuit when an absentee who should be joined cannot be.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).  Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes 
a class action when common questions predominate over individual questions and the class action is 
superior to alternatives, and it lists four factors that the judge should consider when making the highly 
discretionary determinations of predominance and superiority.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D); see 7B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 1785.   It is worth mentioning, however, that recent case law and rule 
amendments have limited discretion in the class action setting to some extent.  See Marcus, Slouching, 
supra note 3, at 1602-04. 
25  For example, the four factors in 19(b) are not meant to be exhaustive, see 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 16, § 1607, at 88, and they have been construed to require an obvious balancing of interests; see 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-111 (1968).  Moreover, 19(b) 
decisions in individual cases are highly fact-specific.  See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 1607, at 90.  
But see id. §§ 1612-1624 (reviewing common factual situations that elicit fairly standard judicial responses 
which can function as presumptions). 
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how to strike the balance in close cases.  These critical normative judgments are left for 
the trial judge to make in individual cases.26   
2. Interpretive Discretion 
The other way the Federal Rules license discretion is by incorporating vague 
language inviting case-specific interpretation.  Of course, language is seldom, if ever, 
clear enough to avoid the need for some interpretation.  However, the Federal Rules I 
have in mind were purposefully written in vague language precisely so trial judges could 
adapt them to the circumstances of specific cases. 
Two examples are Rule 19(a) dealing with compulsory joinder and Rule 24(a) 
dealing with intervention as of right.  Both Rules use similar open-ended language, such 
as “interest” and “impair or impede,” to define the circumstances under which an 
absentee should be joined (Rule 19(a)) or has a right to intervene in the lawsuit (Rule 
24(a)(2)).  When applying the Rule to a particular case, a judge has wide latitude to 
decide whether the absentee’s interest qualifies and whether the impairment or 
impediment is sufficient, and she can consider a range of case-specific management 
considerations in making those decisions.27  
Moreover, case precedent offers little constraint in this area because balancing 
tests and discretionary decisions are normally too fact-specific to support 
generalizations.28  In fact, the tradition of discretion is so strong in federal procedure that 
                                                 
26  See, e.g., 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 1608 (noting that Rule 19(b) “does not state what 
weight is to be given to each factor” and that this means that the judge must assign weights in light of the 
facts of the case and the equity-and-good-conscience test).   
27  Compare Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) (negative precedent risk is 
enough for Rule 19(a) impairment) with Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399 
(3rd Cir. 1993) (negative precedent not enough).   
28  A noted treatise makes this exact point about Rule 24(b).  See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, 
at 393-94 (“precedent is of very little value”).  Furthermore, a leading procedure scholar has observed that 
the cases do little to limit discretion: “one usually finds in these [procedure] treatises a wide range of cases 
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even when a Rule or caselaw interpreting it imposes clear limits, judges sometimes 
circumvent those limits in an effort to do what they believe is best for an individual case.  
A notorious example is how district judges persist in requiring strict pleading despite two 
Supreme Court decisions declaring, in unmistakable terms, that Rule 8(a)(2)’s reference 
to a “short and plain statement” means notice pleading.29   Indeed, some commentators 
applaud this practice, defending judicial power to interpret a Federal Rule flexibly even 
when doing so stretches the Rule beyond its clear bounds.30
III. The History of Procedural Discretion 
The pervasiveness of case-specific discretion prompts the two questions on which 
this Article focuses.  First, how effectively can a trial judge exercise case-specific 
discretion in the highly strategic environment of litigation even armed with goals, multi-
factor balancing tests, past experience, or customary “best practice” standards?   Second, 
which is better and when: case-specific discretion, or more limiting rules that vary with 
different types of cases?  Before addressing these two questions – the first in Part IV and 
the second in Part V – it is important first to explain how the procedural system became 
so dominated by case-specific discretion.  Since I (and others) have recounted this history 
elsewhere,31 I provide only a brief summary here.32
                                                                                                                                                 
offering a baffling array of interpretations that usually provide no more certainty than the vague rule itself.”  
Subrin, Equity, supra note 4, at 923 n.76.  
29  See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003).  The two 
Supreme Court cases in point are Swierkewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).   See also  Shapiro, supra note 3, at 
1995 (noting how district judges cleverly circumvented the then-recently-adopted mandatory scheduling 
conference under Rule 16(b) by stretching an express exemption in 16(b) to the breaking point).  
30  See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2002) (citing and criticizing commentators who support broad 
judicial flexibility in interpreting the Federal Rules).  
31  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L. J. 887, 893-907 (1999) [hereinafter Making Process]; 
Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the 
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A. 1930s Through the 1960s 
The campaign for the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was waged for 
almost thirty years, beginning with Roscoe Pound’s famous address to the American Bar 
Association in 190633 and culminating in congressional passage of the Rules Enabling 
Act in 1934 and eventual adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.  
Advocates of the Federal Rules sought to promulgate a simple and uniform set of rules 
that would govern all civil suits in all federal district courts under a unified system that 
merged law and equity.34
To the early twentieth century reformers, ideal procedural rules were not only 
general and uniform; they were also flexible and capable of being tailored to the 
requirements of individual cases.35   This combination of simplicity, generality, and 
flexibility was achieved by delegating most of the procedural details to the discretion of 
trial judges.  Moreover, delegating discretion in this way made sense within the 
prevailing view of the relationship between procedure and substantive law and the 
prevailing pragmatism of the period.   
Roughly speaking, early twentieth century reformers envisioned procedure 
primarily as a value-neutral means to apply the substantive law.  Procedure was a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78-104 (1989) [hereinafter Mapping]; Subrin, 
Equity, supra note 4; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 
(1982). 
32  I avoid detailed footnoting, since all the points are amply supported by the sources cited in note 31 
supra. 
33  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906). 
34  They also sought to replace legislative rulemaking with court rulemaking.  The court rule-making 
model, which assigned the task of making general procedural rules to the court rather than the legislature, 
was a reaction to the perceived failings of the procedure codes adopted by state legislatures during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.   See Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, at 893-897.  
35  Procedure reformers continually emphasized the values of simplicity and flexibility and the 
desirability of adapting procedures to individual cases.  See Bone, Mapping, supra note 31, at 98-104. 
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“machine” or “tool,” which, like all machines and tools, was best designed by technical 
experts applying principles of sound engineering.36   As trial judges were the technical 
experts, it made sense to delegate broad case-specific discretion to them.37  Moreover, 
delegating discretion had no important substantive implications because substantive 
values were the stuff of substantive law while procedure was governed by technical 
process values, such as those implicit in Rule 1’s directive to “secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.”38
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were celebrated throughout the 1950s and 
1960s as a highly desirable, even ideal, system of rules, and made the centerpiece of most 
first year civil procedure courses.39   The Federal Rules did have some detractors, but 
enthusiasm was widespread and with it came a strong commitment to trial judge 
discretion.40   
In addition, the dominant paradigm of party-controlled litigation likely helped to 
make discretion seem less troubling. This paradigm envisioned a fairly limited role for 
the trial judge as detached and neutral umpire and thus a limited domain over which 
 
36  The metaphor of procedure as “machine” or “tool” pervades the literature of the time.  Bone, 
Making Process, supra note 31, at 895 n.35.  
37  It also made sense to delegate the general rulemaking power to judges (and lawyers), which is 
what the court rulemaking model did.  Id. at 893-897.  Thus, faith in judges as procedure experts operated 
on two levels: the level of making general procedural rules (hence the court rulemaking model) and the 
level of adapting those rules to the needs of particular cases (hence delegations of broad discretion). 
38  FED. R. CIV. P.  1.  A similar theory was used to justify administrative agency discretion during the 
New Deal period and the rise of the administrative state.  Supporters defended delegation with a theory of 
agency legitimacy based on expertise and the objectivity of scientific and technical analysis.  See Richard 
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1677-78 (1975).   
39  Robert G. Bone, Procedural Reform in a Local Context: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court and the Federal Rule Model, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME 
JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992, at 419-420 (Russell K. Osgood, ed. 1992). 
40  Some states refused to revise their own procedures to follow the Federal Rules, but many did.  See 
John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of 
Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1377-78, 1428, 1434 (1986). 
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judicial discretion could operate.41  Moreover, the main focus of attention was on the 
judge’s role in trying cases, not negotiating settlements.42  Today, by contrast, the judge 
has a much broader set of responsibilities, including actively managing litigation and 
directly encouraging settlement, and this creates much more room for discretion and thus 
more cause for concern.  
B. 1970s Onward
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the excitement over the Federal Rules began to 
wane.43  Lawyers and scholars became more concerned about the substantive effects of 
discovery, intervention, class action, and other procedural rules in the context of new and 
expanded forms of public interest litigation, such as civil rights, consumer protection, and 
environmental protection.  Moreover, people began to realize how closely procedure was 
wrapped up with substance.  Not only did procedural rules have substantive effects; they 
could – and many thought they should – be designed to promote substantive values.44
Starting in the mid-1970s, concerns began to mount about the high costs of 
adversarial process.  Critics complained of growing case backlogs, litigation delay, and 
huge litigation costs.45   These developments undermined confidence in adversarial 
process as an ideal for adjudication.  If procedure should be shaped in different ways for 
                                                 
41  The legal process school of thought was extremely influential and legal process theorists like 
Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller championed the adversarial model of litigation which vested 
control in the parties and their attorneys and left the judge mainly to supervise.  See Robert G. Bone, Lon 
Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law 
Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273,  1301-1310 (1995). 
42  For example, the influential legal process theorist Lon Fuller counseled against giving an 
adjudicator a role in settling cases as well as trying them.  See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 406-407 (1978).  See also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 13, at 
947 (describing the debate during the 1940s and 1950s over use of the pretrial conference to discuss 
settlement).  
43  For an overview of these developments, see Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, at 900-07. 
44  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 
84 YALE L. J. 718 (1971); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976). 
45  See Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, at 900-02. 
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different types of disputes, as ADR’s supporters urged, the task of procedural design was 
much more complicated, more closely linked to substance, and potentially more 
controversial than had previously been assumed. 
C. Today
 One might expect that reliance on trial judge discretion would have declined as 
confidence in the supporting assumptions of expertise and value-neutrality waned and the 
substance-procedure divide blurred.46  But this has not happened.  In fact, with judges 
actively involved in settlement and case management and with most lawsuits disposed of 
at the pre-trial stage, the influence of case-specific discretion might well be stronger 
today than ever before.47
What accounts for the relatively uncritical acceptance of discretion?  Three 
factors play an important role.  First, it is very likely that reliance on discretion is partly a 
byproduct of the enthusiasm for case management and settlement promotion today.48  
The flexibility conferred by discretion is essential to these developments, so there would 
be little reason for eager proponents to examine discretion carefully.    
Second, delegating discretion allows rulemakers to dodge difficult and 
controversial normative choices by handing them to trial judges in individual cases, 
where they are less transparent and less likely to trigger public debate.  Indeed, delegation 
                                                 
46  As the line between procedure and substance blurs, rule of law concerns should  loom larger on 
the procedure side of the divide.  For example, imagine a system in which trial judges always tailored the 
rules of negligence or contract to the “needs” of specific cases in an effort to do individualized justice.  
Such a system would almost certainly be condemned on rule of law grounds.  When a strict rule dictates the 
result, it is supposed to be followed (absent gross injustice) even if the trial judge believes that a different 
result would better fit the costs and benefits or moral stakes involved in a particular case.  If procedure 
implicates substantive values and has substantive effects, one should worry about these same rule of law 
concerns when formulating procedure. 
47  See Marcus, Slouching, supra note 3, at 1589-90; Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood 
Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 631, 646-667 [hereinafter Misunderstood 
Consequences]. 
48  See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 13, at 925-29, 944-49. 
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is an especially attractive strategy when, as has been increasingly true in recent years, 
rulemakers themselves are divided or face strongly conflicting interest group pressures.49  
It is much easier to compromise on a general rule that leaves the controversial issues to 
the discretion of the trial judge than to resolve the disagreement at the level of drafting 
the general rule itself.50
Third, judges have come to dominate membership on the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad discretion.51  Discretion gives 
them more control over their own courtrooms and cases,52 and makes judging more 
interesting and potentially more rewarding.53  
 
49  For example, the 1993 amendments to the discovery rules that allowed for mandatory disclosure 
triggered a storm of controversy, pitting plaintiff’s bar against the corporate bar, and so too did proposed 
changes to Rule 68’s fee-shifting provisions and the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.  See Bone, Making 
Process, supra note 31, at 902-07.  
50  See id. at 917-18 & n.156.  See also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly 
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 22074-79 (1989) (advocating general trans-substantive rules to prevent politicization 
of the committee process). 
51  See Yeazell, Judging Rules, supra note 14, at 237-39 (observing that judges dominate Advisory 
Committee membership). 
52  See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 221, 238 (1997) (noting judges preference for control); Resnik, Changing Practices, supra 
note 14, at 199-200 (noting that judges prize control over their own courtrooms).   Indeed, when asked, trial 
judges often prefer broader discretion to formal constraint.  See, e.g, Marcus, Slouching, supra note 3, at 
1586 (noting the “vehement objection” of many federal judges to the elimination of the local opt-out option 
in the mandatory disclosure rules); James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive?: An Evaluation 
of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 28, 40, 48 (1995) 
(reporting that federal trial judges resisted formal case-tracking in favor of individual discretionary case 
management). 
53  See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J 
LEG. STUD. 627, 630-631 (1994); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, or What’s 
Unconstitutional About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991).  See generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, 117-123 (1995 ) (analyzing an appellate judge’s utility function).  
But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 647 (1994) 
(criticizing aspects of Macey’s analysis).  
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Thus, rulemakers do not have incentives to reflect carefully on the costs and 
benefits of discretionary rules.  If they did, they would discover that there are strong 
reasons to be skeptical about broad delegations of discretion.54  Part IV explains why. 
IV. Problems with Procedural Discretion 
According to some theories of common law evolution, the survival of a rule or 
practice over a long period of time is evidence of its efficacy.55   The history recounted in 
Part III provides an important counter to any attempt to defend discretion on this basis.  
In the case of procedure, the current discretionary system results from deliberate 
committee choice rather than incremental common law evolution and persists today for 
reasons, such as politics and judicial self-interest, that have little to do with functional 
efficacy.56
Without support of historical pedigree, case-specific discretion must be evaluated 
explicitly in terms of its costs and benefits.  Unfortunately, there is very little systematic 
empirical evidence available to make this evaluation.57  In 1996, the RAND Institute for 
                                                 
54  I believe that rulemakers care about designing good rules but that they assume discretion works 
well and do not critically examine the assumption partly because it serves their political and practical 
interests.   By clearly explaining why discretion is problematic and why strict rules and other types of limits 
can be superior, I hope to shake this naïve confidence, prompt more careful reflection on discretion’s costs, 
and make it more difficult for rulemakers to defend the practice publicly and in public interest terms.   
55  For example, some commentators argue that the common law evolves toward efficient rules.  See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 614-615 (5th ed. 1998) (hereinafter 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS).  But see Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law 
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 139 (1980) (arguing that common law evolution cannot 
guarantee efficient rules). 
56  It is true that discretion played a significant role in the procedure historically followed by courts of 
equity and also that the original drafters of the Federal Rules drew on this tradition.   See Subrin, Equity, 
supra note 4.   However, the Federal Rule’s reliance on discretion is not simply a carryover from equity.  
The drafters viewed procedure quite differently than their predecessors and designed a more discretionary 
system that explicitly focused on the pragmatic expertise of trial judges.  See Bone, Mapping, supra note 
31, at 78-104.  
57  Very little reliable empirical research has been done in the procedure field, although interest seems 
to be on the rise in recent years.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 135, 146-147 (2002); Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: Problems and 
Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 56 (1988) (identifying practical obstacles to empirical research). 
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Civil Justice published a study of case management and ADR in federal court based on 
data compiled from the Civil Justice Reform Act’s pilot program.58  Those conducting 
the study had hoped to compare a case-specific discretionary approach with a “tracking 
model” that set predetermined  procedures for different types of cases.59  Unfortunately, 
the comparison could not be made because only one of the ten pilot districts implemented 
the tracking model in a significant way.60  Interestingly, the authors explained the 
resistance to tracking by the desire of trial judges to “tailor case management to the needs 
of the case and to their style of management,” further evidence that judges value their 
own discretion very highly.61  
Still, the RAND study did test various case management techniques using a 
combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative survey results.62  The findings are 
mixed.  Most techniques had no significant impact one way or the other on cost 
(measured in attorney time), time to disposition, participant satisfaction, or subjective 
views of the fairness of the process.63  There were some exceptions.  For example, early 
 
58  The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) passed by Congress in 1990, created an experimental 
program to test the efficacy of case management and ADR techniques.  See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089 (1990).  The program involved designating ten pilot and ten comparison districts, chosen to be 
representative of the federal judiciary along various dimensions.  The CJRA required each designated 
district to develop and implement a case management plan with input from various constituency groups and 
required the ten pilot districts to incorporate certain principles and techniques.  The Judicial Conference 
and Administrative Office of the United States Courts retained RAND to evaluate the resulting data, and 
the RAND study produced four published reports:  KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT,  
supra note 21; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT 
AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (RAND 1996) [hereinafter “IMPLEMENTATION”]; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., 
AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT (RAND 1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (RAND 1996). 
59  See KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at xxii-xxiii 
(discussing the difficulties of comparing the “judicial discretion model” with the “tracking model”).    
60  Id. 
61  KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 59, at 46. 
62  See KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at xviii-xx. 
63  Id. at 88-92. 
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case management intervention reduced the time to disposition but also increased costs.64  
In addition, setting a firm trial date early and sticking to it reduced the time to disposition, 
as did a shortened cutoff date for discovery, which reduced both time to disposition and 
cost.65  
Unfortunately, these findings shed very little light on the merits of case-specific 
discretion.66  On the one hand, the fact that few techniques tested had any significant 
impact might suggest that the benefits of discretionary case management are exaggerated.  
On the other hand, some techniques, such as early judicial intervention to set a firm trial 
date and a shortened discovery cutoff, did show positive effects.  Since case tracking was 
not tested, however, there is no way to tell whether the same or even stronger positive 
effects could be achieved by predetermined rules.67  One result does weigh slightly in 
favor of constraining discretion: the benefits of a firm trial date and shortened discovery 
cutoff obviously depend on a judge being constrained from modifying the trial date or 
extending discovery later if the parties seek a change.68  
 
64  Id. 
65  Id.  But see Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice 
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 581 (1998) (reporting other results that 
conflict with the RAND results). These findings led the authors to propose early intervention with a firm 
trial date (thereby reducing the time to disposition but increasing cost) combined with a shortened time to 
discovery cutoff (thereby offsetting the cost increase).  KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at 91-92. 
66  In another empirical study published in 1994, the Federal Judicial Center reported the results of a 
survey canvassing the views of federal district and appellate judges on a number of problems facing the 
federal judiciary.  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES (1994) [hereinafter PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE].  
The results show strong support among federal district judges for ADR and increased use of phased 
discovery in multiple-issue cases.  Id. at 35, 43.  However, the study did not ask about case-specific 
discretion versus more categorical case-tracking approaches, so it is not clear whether the judicial responses 
reflect approval of a discretionary approach. 
67  However, the study authors do point out that an effective tracking method could be difficult to 
design because “objective data available at the time of filing are not particularly good predictors of either 
time to disposition or cost of litigation.  KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 
21, at xxiii. 
68  See infra notes ** and accompanying text (discussing the importance of strict rules to support pre-
commitment, given the difficulty of sticking with a decision ex post when conditions change). 
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There is an even more serious problem with the RAND study, a problem that 
many other empirical studies share.69  In evaluating a discretionary versus constrained 
approach, one important variable to measure is the quality of the judgments and 
settlements produced under the different schemes.  But the RAND study does not 
measure outcome quality in any useful way.70   Indeed, doing so is extremely difficult 
because of the huge obstacles to collecting and evaluating the relevant data.71  
One might be tempted to extract lessons for civil process from the debate over the 
criminal sentencing Guidelines.72  During the 1980s, the United States Sentencing 
Commission promulgated Guidelines to constrain the open-ended discretion of trial 
judges at the sentencing stage.73  These Guidelines, designed to enhance predictability 
and distributional fairness, have been subjected to heavy criticism, and most district 
judges chafe under the constraints.74   However, the concerns have a lot to do with the 
serious costs of error in criminal cases, and especially the effect of an unfairly strict 
 
69  It is also worth mentioning that the RAND study has been heavily criticized for using flawed 
empirical methods.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 770-71 (1995); cf. Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial 
Device With No Effects, 21 PACE L. REV. 203, 251-268 (2000) (citing empirical deficiencies of the RAND 
and Federal Judicial Center studies related to mandatory disclosure). 
70  The study does survey the subjective reactions of parties and lawyers, see KAKALIK ET AL., 
EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at xviii-xx, but obviously this is not the same thing as 
measuring quality.  
71  For example, one ideally would like to compare strong cases to strong cases and weak cases to 
weak cases under different case management regimes, but it is impossible to sort cases in this way without 
much more information about the underlying merits than is currently available and perhaps ever could be 
obtained.  
72  See Rachel Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 
312 (2004) (noting the intense controversy).  For a recent attack on the sentencing guidelines that focuses 
on the morally problematic disparities they create, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and 
Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005).  
73  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-370 (1989) (reviewing this history and 
upholding the constitutionality of the guidelines). 
74  See, e.g, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 66, at 37 (reporting that 71.8% of district judges 
strongly support and 14.6% moderately support changing the current sentencing rules to increase the 
discretion of the judge).   Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently restored a measure of case-
specific discretion to federal sentencing.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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sentence in an individual case, and these concerns are not nearly as serious on the civil 
side.   
Another possibility is to study procedural innovation on the state level, but here 
too useful data is limited.75   Moreover, the few studies that do exist shed little light on 
the issue of case-specific discretion.76  For example, although there has been a great deal 
of state innovation in discovery reform, much of it adopting stricter limits and some of it 
implementing case tracking, to the best of my knowledge no one has yet done the 
necessary empirical work to analyze the data in a systematic way.77  
Thus, proceduralists face a difficult problem.  They must decide how much to rely 
on trial judge discretion without reliable empirical information about the likely effects.  A 
tempting response to this kind of uncertainty is to reject change and stick with the status 
quo.  Sometimes this makes sense, but it does not make sense in this situation, where the 
status quo itself is suspect, shaped by factors, such as politics and judicial self-interest, 
that have nothing to do with the policy merits. 
 
75  One state study deserves particular mention.  From 2000 to 2002, the state of Colorado conducted 
a pilot study of simplified procedures designed to reduce delay and expense in smaller cases.  See Richard 
P. Holme, Back to the Future – New Rule 16.1: Simplified Procedure for Civil Cases Up to $100,000, 33 
COLORADO LAWYER 11, 12 (2004).  Of particular relevance to the issue of discretion, the simplified 
procedures imposed strict discovery limits by general rule without any provision for judicially granted 
exceptions.   See Richard P. Holme, Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive: Possible Simplified Procedure for 
Cases Under $100,000, 29 COLORADO LAWYER 5 (2000) (explaining that the Colorado judicial caseload 
was thought to be too heavy to leave much time for individual case management).  Colorado trial judges 
enthusiastically received the new procedures, which were eventually adopted in a permanent rule.  33 
COLORADO LAWYER, supra at 12-13 (noting that more than two-thirds of the civil caseload of the two 
county courts in the pilot study proceeded under the new rule and concluding that “the result of the pilot 
project was that [the new rule] proved more acceptable than even its most ardent advocates expected.”).  
Although these favorable results are suggestive, there is no way to tell how much the absence of discretion 
in itself made a difference and no way to draw any stronger conclusions without much more data. 
76  See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 59 
CASE W. RES. 813, 839-848 (2000) (studying the effect of various factors on time to disposition for a set of 
state court trial outcomes, but without any implications for discretion versus rule). 
77  See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a 
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1167, 1174, 1209-46 (2005); Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and 
the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 611-637 (2002).   
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Under these circumstances, the only way to arrive at a sensible decision is to use 
whatever information is available to make plausible predictions about likely effects.  The 
following analysis uses this approach.  It applies current empirical and theoretical 
understandings of human decisionmaking and strategic interaction to what we know 
about the dynamics of civil litigation.  The resulting predictions are necessarily imprecise 
and uncertain, but they are the best we can do.78
The discussion focuses on three factors that interfere with case-specific discretion: 
(1) bounded rationality, which is a more serious problem when judges make decisions for 
specific cases; (2) information access obstacles, which are particularly acute when parties 
have incentives to be selective about information disclosure, and (3) strategic interaction 
effects, which multiply when judges try to manage the parties and become players 
themselves in the litigation game.   
Furthermore, two aspects of litigation exacerbate the adverse effects of these three 
factors.  First, procedure works as a tightly integrated system.79  Choices made at the 
pleading stage, for example, affect the discovery stage and discovery affects summary 
judgment and trial.  The interactions work the other way around too.  If a judge has a 
reputation for using her discretion to deny summary judgment even when all the formal 
requirements are satisfied,80 parties will take that fact into account much earlier, even as 
early as the pleading stage.  These systemic interactions mean that a trial judge must 
 
78  See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY 93-94 (1982) (“the lack of a 
study is not ... a necessary or sufficient reason for delaying change that experience and common sense 
recommends”); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 780-81 (1998) 
(noting the need for action despite uncertainty). 
79  See Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 47, at 676-77 (emphasizing the importance 
of a systemic perspective). 
80  See Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in 
the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 104-105 (2002) (noting that the majority of 
federal courts allow this). 
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consider the likely impact on all stages of the litigation when she makes a choice at any 
one stage, and the complexity of that task only exacerbates the effects of bounded 
rationality, limited information, and strategic interaction.  
The second reason why the three factors are particularly serious also has to do 
with the complexity of the judge’s task, but in a different way.  Not only must the judge 
anticipate effects at all stages of the litigation; she must also consider effects on 
settlement as well as on trial, and doing this requires complicated outcome quality 
tradeoffs.  The current Federal Rules mandate attention to settlement, but my point runs 
deeper.  Any well functioning procedural system must take account of settlement effects 
if it is to accomplish its purposes well.  As we shall see, however, procedures that 
produce good settlements do not necessarily produce good trial judgments.  As a result, 
judges must consider settlement effects explicitly in order to achieve an optimal tradeoff 
between the quality of settlements and the quality of judgments. 
The following first explains why settlement quality and judgment quality often 
conflict.  It then analyzes bounded rationality constraints, information access obstacles, 
and strategic interaction effects under conditions where the judge must choose procedures 
that work interactively with an eye to maximizing the tradeoff between settlement and 
judgment quality. 
A. Settlement and Trial
1. The Normative Relevance of Settlement
Some critics of settlement come close at times to arguing that federal judges 
should focus exclusively on trial and pay no attention to settlement at all.  This position, 
at least in its extreme form, is indefensible on any sensible normative account of 
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contemporary adjudication.  The primary goal of procedure is to produce outcomes that 
enforce the substantive law, and all outcomes matter to furthering this goal – settlements 
as well as judgments – no matter how enforcement is valued, whether in terms of creating 
socially optimal incentives, protecting rights, or promoting distributive justice. 
This point holds for both an economic theory and a rights theory of procedure.81  
The economic theory values procedure as a way to reduce the risk of outcome error.82  
Accurate outcomes are valuable in this theory because they deter potential wrongdoers.  
With accurate enforcement, rational individuals expect to face liability if and only if they 
behave unlawfully and as a result they conform their behavior to the substantive standard.  
It follows that as procedure reduces the risk of outcome error, it also reduces the 
incidence of unlawful behavior and thus the resulting social costs.  At the same time, 
procedure adds costs of its own.  The overall objective is to design a procedural system 
that minimizes the sum of expected error costs and expected process costs.83
It is a simple matter to see that settlement and judgment quality are equally 
important in this theory.  Rational actors consider all possible litigation outcomes – both 
judgments and settlements – when they evaluate the risk and cost of sanctions and 
compare it to the benefits of engaging in the activity.   Thus, it is the overall pattern of 
outcomes that matters because it is the overall pattern that deters.  So the procedural 
system must be judged by the pattern it creates. 
 
81  For another discussion of some of these issues, see Robert G. Bone, Settlement in American Civil 
Adjudication: The Role of Procedural Law and the Courts 36 COMP. L. REV. 1, 31-36 (2003) 
82  It is worth noting that the concept of accuracy does not imply that a uniquely correct outcome 
exists.  It is enough that there is a range of equally valid outcomes, provided the range is limited and leaves 
out some possibilities.  Moreover, accuracy is also meaningful for common law making as long it is 
possible to criticize some decisions as wrong. 
83  See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 55, § 21.1, at 559-602. 
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A rights theory also values procedure for reducing the risk of outcome error, but it 
values accuracy differently than an economic theory.  Accurate outcomes are valuable in 
a rights theory because they protect individual rights or redress instances of unfair 
treatment, rather than because they deter. 84  The focus of a rights theory is on the 
individual, not the society-at-large, and the goal is to compensate for wrongful injury to 
an individual’s rights, not to minimize social costs.85   Nevertheless, the relevance of 
settlement quality is the same.  It should not matter how adjudication vindicates rights, 
whether by judgment or by settlement: a rights theory should be concerned about any 
unjust outcome that fails to provide the correct level of compensation according to the 
substantive law.    
There is a rub, however, and it has to do with the normative significance of 
consent.  The question is whether consent alone can validate a settlement without having 
to consider its quality.  The answer is clearly no from an economic perspective.  
Deterrence affects everyone, not just the settling parties, so there is sound reason to worry 
about settlement quality when the parties’ private interests in settlement diverge from the 
public interest in optimal deterrence.86  The question is more difficult in a rights theory, 
 
84  At least this is true for an outcome-based rights theory.  There is also a process-based form of 
rights theory that focuses on how procedure itself, independent of outcome quality, treats individuals.  For 
example, a party might be given certain participation rights because participation in an adversary setting is 
likely to produce a good outcome that protects rights (outcome-based), or because participation is entailed 
in what it means to respect the dignity of those affected by adjudication (process-based).   It should be clear 
that the value of adjudicative procedure must be primarily outcome-based, whatever a process-based theory 
adds, since adjudication is designed mainly to produce outcomes that conform to the substantive law. See 
Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural 
Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 508-516 (2003) [hereinafter Agreeing to Fair Process]. 
85  An example is the corrective justice theory, which treats tort law as a system for correcting moral 
wrongs or redressing invasions of moral rights.  See, e.g., JULES A. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 
34 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL.. U. L. REV. 485 (1989). 
86  In fact, this divergence is quite common because litigating parties do not fully internalize the 
effects of trial and settlement on deterrence.  Analyzing the resulting problems and their significance for 
settlement policy can get quite complicated.  See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between 
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however, because ordinarily rightholders are free to waive, limit, or transfer their rights 
as they please, which is exactly what they do when they settle.  
The reason one should worry about settlement quality in a rights theory has to do 
with the conditions for normatively valid consent.  Consent alone cannot validate a 
choice if the consenting party’s only other options are themselves unfair or unjust.  When 
parties decide whether to settle and on what terms, they compare the proposed settlement 
to their next best alternative, which is a trial judgment, and they also factor in the costs of 
trial.  Accordingly, if a procedural system produces trial judgments that are 
systematically unjust or distributes costs asymmetrically in a way that unfairly burdens 
one side, that system will also produce distorted settlements that reflect the normatively 
flawed trial baseline.  Rational parties will consent to those settlements because they have 
no better alternative.87  Simply put, a party who consents to an otherwise unjust 
settlement does not also consent to the trial procedures or pattern of judgments that bring 
that settlement about.88  Therefore, consent alone cannot validate a settlement when it is 
induced by unjust trial outcomes or unfair cost allocations.89
 
the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 575, 601-608 (1997).   My 
point is simple, however: economic theory cannot rely on consent alone and ignore quality.  
87  There is another way to make this point.  When litigating parties settle, they in effect buy and sell 
substantive and procedural rights.  If there were many sellers and buyers in a deep market, we might be 
able to rely on market competition to regulate settlement quality.  However, because of restrictions on 
selling claims imposed by the rules of professional responsibility, normally the plaintiff can sell her claim 
only to the defendant; that is, the transaction is a bilateral monopoly.  For this reason, we cannot simply 
defer to consent uncritically without examining the bargaining conditions under which the purchase and 
sale take place.  For more rigorous accounts of rights-based procedural theory, see Ronald Dworkin, 
Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day 
in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 256-64 (1992) (distinguishing among 
different versions of a rights-based theory).  
88  Defining what constitutes an unjust settlement in a precise way is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Fortunately, nothing in what I argue here depends on having a precise definition.   The argument assumes 
only that there is a basis for criticizing the amount of a settlement or pattern of settlements, which should 
be intuitively obvious.  Indeed, there is good reason to associate a just settlement with the ideal expected 
trial award.  See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L. 
J. 61, 76 (1995).  By “ideal” expected trial award, I mean the trial award that parties would expect in a 
Procedural Discretion  Page 29 
 
 
2. The Conflict between Judgment and Settlement
Even with settlement and judgment quality counting equally, it might still be 
possible to focus exclusively on trial judgments if procedures designed to produce the 
best judgments also happened to produce the best settlements.  But this happy 
convergence is not likely.   The reason has to do with the strategic nature of litigation.  A 
procedural rule that is beneficial from the perspective of trial can become harmful from 
the perspective of settlement because settlement opens up new strategic options that 
parties can exploit to gain bargaining leverage.90
To illustrate, consider the problem of designing optimal discovery rules.  
Someone who focuses exclusively on trial is likely to favor broader discovery than 
someone who also considers settlement.  Broad discovery helps to uncover evidence 
useful for trial.  This benefit remains the same but the costs of discovery increase 
substantially when settlement is added to the mix, because settlement opens up new 
opportunities for strategic abuse.  For example, a more powerful party might threaten to 
                                                                                                                                                 
litigation system that does not distort trial judgments or skew litigation costs.   If both parties are rational 
and risk-neutral, expect to spend the same amount on litigation costs, and have equal bargaining power, 
settlement theory predicts that they will settle for the expected trial award.  See generally POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 55, §21.5, at 607-610.  Thus, the expected trial award is associated with a 
litigation system that has attractive fairness properties – equal risk-preferences, equal litigation costs, and 
equal bargaining power.   
89  For this reason, it is simply wrong to believe that settlements are exclusively the private business 
of the parties. Adjudication exists to serve social ends, and its outcomes, whether judgments or settlements, 
must be measured against the ends that the institution is meant to serve. 
90  The point can be stated more precisely in game theory terms.  Litigation can be modeled as a game 
between lawyers (and the parties they represent) with the feasible strategies defined by the procedural rules 
and the possible payoffs determined by the substantive law.  See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND 
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 10-14 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the elements of a 
game).  In these terms, the reason why settlement quality does not correlate with judgment quality is that 
the set of feasible strategies, and thus the game itself, changes dramatically when the players are allowed to 
make settlement not just trial moves.  Since procedural rules control strategic behavior, it should not be 
surprising that different litigation games would require different rules. 
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escalate its opponent’s costs by engaging in abusive discovery unrelated to the merits. 91  
If the opponent believes that it will have to endure costly discovery in the absence of 
settlement or face revelation of marginally relevant but highly embarrassing facts that a 
settlement would conceal, the opponent should be much more willing to settle and on 
terms more favorable to the threatening party.  Thus, discovery is more costly from a 
settlement perspective, and as a result the cost-benefit balance is likely to support more 
limited discovery rules in order to control bad settlements, even if those rules sacrifice 
some measure of judgment quality by reducing the evidence available for trial.92  
This is a pervasive phenomenon – procedures designed to maximize the 
likelihood of quality judgments will not necessarily maximize the likelihood of quality 
settlements, and vice versa.93  This means that someone designing a procedural system 
must not only balance the costs and benefits for settlement and for judgment separately, 
but must also balance settlement effects against judgment effects. 
B. Obstacles to Effective Exercise of Procedural Discretion
Neither defenders nor critics of procedural discretion appreciate the magnitude of 
the problems broad discretion creates.  Many commentators focus on arbitariness, bias, or 
                                                 
91  See, e.g., John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear 
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 584-93, 615-28 (1989). 
92  More precisely, someone concerned only about judgments might still consider the added litigation 
costs produced when parties use broad discovery strategically, but would ignore the social costs associated 
with the bad settlements.   
93  Another example is the appropriate degree of pleading specificity.  A liberal notice pleading rule 
facilitates meritorious suits but also facilitates frivolous suits; a more onerous strict pleading rule screens 
frivolous suits but also screens meritorious suits. See Ackerman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 172 
F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1999); ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 125-157 (2003) 
[hereinafter ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE].  A rulemaker or judge concerned only about judgment 
quality should favor a liberal notice pleading rule because that rule maximizes the likelihood that 
meritorious suits will be filed and reach trial.  As for frivolous suits, they are usually settled or dropped 
before trial so have little impact on the quality of trial judgments.  On the other hand, a rulemaker or judge 
concerned about settlement quality is likely to favor a stricter pleading rule. To be sure, a strict pleading 
rule reduces judgment quality by screening some meritorious suits, but it also improves settlement quality 
by screening frivolous suits.  Thus, the choice of pleading rule requires a tradeoff between judgment quality 
and settlement quality – no single rule maximizes both simultaneously. 
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other forms of potential abuse.94   But the most serious problems lie elsewhere.  They are 
endemic to the exercise of discretion itself and arise even when trial judges do their very 
best to choose optimal procedures for the particular case.  The following discussion 
focuses on three such problems: bounded rationality constraints, information access 
obstacles, and strategic interaction effects.  Given that the task of procedural design 
requires a complicated assessment of judgment and settlement effects within the context 
of a tightly integrated system, these problems, taken together, make a powerful case for 
greater caution in delegating discretion to the trial judge. 
1. Bounded Rationality
 There is an extensive literature in cognitive psychology examining the way 
human beings make complex decisions.  Studies show that people have bounded 
rationality; they employ heuristics and schema to process complicated information, which 
introduce systematic biases into the decisionmaking process.95  Professors Jeff 
Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and others have explored some of the implications for 
procedure, and in recent work they have enlarged their focus to include decisionmaking 
by judges as well as by parties and their lawyers.96  When a judge chooses optimal 
procedures for a case, she makes an extremely complex decision involving complicated 
                                                 
94  See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 4, at 44-46 (noting the focus on arbitrariness); Thomas M. Mengler, 
The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 465 n. 287 (1989) 
(characterizing critics of broad discretion as raising concerns about judicial bias and arbitrariness); Carl 
Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 
951-52 (1991) (criticizing how judges exercised the broad discretion granted by the 1983 amendments to 
Rules 11, 16, and 26 to the detriment of civil rights plaintiffs). Occasionally critics mention competency 
concerns but usually only in a rather general way.  See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 4, at 548.  
95  See Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
96  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); W. 
Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26 (1999).  For sources discussing 
bounded rationality effects on parties and lawyers, see Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996); George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving 
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 222 J. LEG. STUD. 135 (1993).   
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facts, great uncertainty, and difficult predictive judgments.  It would be natural for her to 
rely on the same heuristics and schema that inform complex decisionmaking outside the 
courtroom – and with similar adverse effects. 
 For example, in a recent study of magistrate judges that tested for several 
common heuristics (or as they are also called “cognitive illusions”) in different litigation 
contexts, the results showed statistically significant biasing effects, with the strongest for 
anchoring, hindsight, and egocentric biases.97  It is important, however, to exercise 
caution in generalizing from data like this because none of the studies test actual 
courtroom conditions.   As the authors of the magistrate study note, judges are probably 
more motivated to arrive at good decisions when they are in the courtroom than when 
they are participating in an experiment, and they certainly have more time to deliberate.98   
Nevertheless, judges still must process complex factual information and make 
difficult predictions, and these tasks invite the use of heuristics and schema.99   
Moreover, while their expertise might help to some extent, it cannot cure all the problems 
and may exacerbate some.100  The adversary interaction of a lawsuit can help somewhat 
 
97  Guthrie et al., supra note 96, at 787-816 (testing three scenarios: calculating a damage award, 
evaluating a proposed settlement offer, and assessing the strength of evidence).   Anchoring bias refers to 
the tendency to use a known fact to anchor estimates of an unknown, with the result that estimates tend to 
be lower when the anchor is lower and higher when the anchor is higher.  See id. at 787-89.  Hindsight bias 
refers to the way people tend to “Monday morning quarterback” decisions by allowing their knowledge of 
the actual outcome to affect their ex ante predictions about whether that outcome will occur. See id. at 799-
801.  Egocentric bias refers to the tendency people have to be more confident of their own abilities and 
prospects than the objective evidence warrants.  See id. at 811-813. 
98  Id  at 819-20. 
99  Id. 
100  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Governmental 
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558-61 (2002) [hereinafter Optimal Government Design]; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance and Adaptation, 79 ORE. L. REV. 61, 63-64 
(2000) [hereinafter Heuristics and Biases] (reporting on psychological studies that reveal “biases plaguing 
experts’ judgments” and speculating that courts might suffer from impediments to effective institutional 
adaptation).  
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by forcing the judge to consider different perspectives, but it is not likely to eliminate all 
sources of bias.101
Perhaps the most obvious area where these factors have a distorting effect is in 
judicial settlement promotion.  The egocentric bias (sometimes called the overconfidence 
bias) can inflate a judge’s confidence in her ability to predict settlement effects, which in 
turn can cause her to take bolder steps than she should given the actual likelihood of 
success and the potential costs of failure.  In addition, the anchoring bias can distort the 
judge’s estimate of what is a fair settlement.  If the judge hears the plaintiff’s settlement 
offer first, for example, the figure she hears can anchor her own estimate of what is fair, 
influencing her to push the parties toward the high (pro-plaintiff) end of the settlement 
range.102  Finally, several different biases can affect the judge’s estimate of the likelihood 
of plaintiff’s success as part of calculating a reasonable settlement amount, including the 
representativeness heuristic and the framing effect, both of which lead people to worry 
more about losses than gains.103
Settlement promotion is not the only area where biases can have distorting effects.  
Consider a decision about how much discovery to allow.  An assessment of the discovery 
needs of a particular case is susceptible to the distorting influence of yet another heuristic 
known as the availability heuristic.  The availability heuristic refers to the human 
 
101  See Guthrie et al., supra note 96, at 822-23. 
102  The anchoring effects of opening offers on the parties’ settlement expectations has been 
demonstrated in the experimental literature.  See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers 
to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 139-142 (1994).  One might 
expect similar anchoring effects for judges as well. 
103  The representativeness heuristic is rather complex, but it describes the way people tend to ignore 
base rate statistics when making estimates of probability.  See Guthrie et al., supra note 96, at 805-808.  
The framing effect refers to the way people are affected by how a choice is framed.  For example, people 
tend to choose differently when the identical tradeoff is framed in terms of losses than when it is framed in 
terms of gains.  See id. at 794-796.  Another factor plays a role as well.  Most judges are not trained experts 
in settlement facilitation or ADR.  Thus, if expertise provides any corrective to cognitive bias, it is likely to 
operate more weakly in the settlement context than in other procedural settings. 
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tendency to make predictions based on particularly salient and memorable examples that 
are in fact statistically aberrational.104  For example, a judge might more easily recall 
cases where discovery was abused, leading her to assign an excessively high probability 
of abuse in the case before her and therefore choose stricter discovery limits than the case 
warrants. 
Indeed, many of the discretionary procedural decisions judges make are likely to 
be influenced by the judge’s prediction of likely success and her estimate of the stakes 
and litigation costs, all of which are susceptible to cognitive bias.  So too, much of what a 
judge does when making predictions involves comparing the case before her with similar 
cases that she has handled in the past, and this process is likely to be infected by the 
availability heuristic and other biases.  Finally, to assure an efficient and fair system 
overall, the judge should make an effort to predict the effect of her procedural choices on 
later litigation events, such as the effect of a discovery choice on later settlement 
bargaining or the effect of a pattern of summary judgment decisions on filing and 
litigation incentives in future cases.   These predictions too are prone to cognitive bias.105  
If errors induced by these biases were randomly distributed about a mean of zero, 
a party deciding how to behave ex ante might simply average out the likely effects.  As 
long as the variance was not too great and party risk aversion not too strong, any adverse 
impact could be ignored from an efficiency perspective.   However, cognitive biases tend 
to produce systematic, not random, errors and operate similarly in most human beings.106  
Furthermore, in any given case, the bias will be realized in a particular direction, and the 
party who is burdened would have reason to object on fairness grounds. 
 
104  See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 95, at 1087-1090. 
105  See Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 100, at  93-99. 
106  See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 95, at 1085. 
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The fact that trial judge discretion is infected by cognitive bias is no reason to 
limit that discretion, however, unless the alternative – rules created in advance by an 
advisory committee process – is less susceptible to the problem.  Obviously cognitive 
illusions affect all forms of complex decisionmaking, but some institutional settings do a 
better job than others of managing the effects.107  There are reasons to believe that the 
advisory committee process is superior in this regard, at least compared to 
decisionmaking by individual judges.108
The advisory and standing committee structure, coupled with further layers of 
review by the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and ultimately Congress, helps to 
assure that multiple perspectives are brought to bear on the choice of procedural rules, 
thereby reducing the influence of the framing effect.109  This hierarchical system of 
review also assures that ample time is taken for discussion and deliberation, thereby 
reducing the influence of the availability heuristic and other cognitive illusions.  The 
process also forces rulemakers to examine procedural design from an outsider perspective 
viewing the system as a whole, rather than from an insider perspective focusing on 
procedural design in a particular case.110  Studies show that the effects of cognitive bias 
can be reduced when a decisionmaker adopts an outsider perspective.111  Finally, public 
input into the process can help correct for the availability bias by exposing rulemakers to 
 
107  Rachlinski & Farina, Optimal Government Design, supra note 100, at 561-562.  
108  Id. at 572-574, 586 (describing some of the advantages of committees in mitigating cognitive 
bias).  
109  On multiple perspectives and the framing effect, see Guthrie et al., supra note 96, at 822-823. 
110  See, e.g., Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 100, at 65-66, 99-101 (discussing the 
difference between outsider and insider perspectives). 
111  See, e.g., id.; Rachlinski & Farina, Optimal Government Design, supra note 100, at 578 (noting 
that judges deciding cases one at a time are likely to have trouble adopting an outsider perspective). 
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a full range of empirical data.  The egocentric bias remains, but it should help that the 
committee includes different egos with different points of view. 
The advisory committee process is also better structured to obtain systematic 
feedback on the efficacy of procedural rules in practice, and this facilitates adaptive 
learning that can help correct initial cognitive error.112  Systematic feedback is much 
more difficult for a single judge. The only effective way a judge can evaluate her own 
discretionary choices is to compare them with those of her fellow judges, but it is 
unlikely that one judge will learn systematically from others without a formal method for 
gathering information.113  Judges do have some access to informal sources, such as 
seminars and informal publications, but they have no comprehensive or systematic way 
to learn what their colleagues have done, debate the merits of the different choices, and 
even test the efficacy of their own (especially with regard to outcome quality). 
2. Information Access
Even if a judge is able to process information without cognitive bias, her choice 
of procedure is only as good as the information she receives.114  However, much of the 
case-specific information the judge needs is in the private possession of the parties and 
their lawyers.  This creates two major problems.  First, extracting the information can be 
costly, especially when an adversary hearing is required.  Second, the parties and their 
                                                 
112  See Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 100, at 63-64. 
113  And in the absence of strong feedback, a combination of framing, the escalating commitment 
effect, and the egocentric bias can cause a judge to lock into a routine set of practices even when those 
practices are suboptimal or flawed.  See Rachlinski & Farina, Optimal Government Design, supra note 100, 
at 604-06 (discussing the “stickiness” of imperfect regulatory solutions).   Decentralized decisionmaking 
can have advantages in some settings by allowing experimentation and harvesting of local knowledge, but 
these benefits can be achieved only with some mechanism for correcting errors and facilitating the 
evolution of decisions toward optimality, which is largely absent from the current procedural system.  
114  See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 
1042 (1975) (“Without an investigative file, the American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, 
acting in spasms as sudden flashes of seeming light may lead or mislead him at odd times.”).  
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lawyers have incentives to conceal their private information and mislead the court.  It is 
true that these incentives exist throughout the litigation, but they are much more likely to 
reap benefits early in a case before parties have a chance to use discovery to force 
disclosure.   And it is early in the case that the trial judge makes many of the critical 
scheduling and management decisions that shape the direction of the suit and the 
bargaining conditions for a future settlement. 
The conventional assumption underlying the commitment to adversarial fact-
finding is that competition between adversaries is likely to ferret out the truth.   One 
might assume then that adversarial argument at a scheduling conference or hearing would 
give the judge a reasonably accurate picture of the lawsuit.  But this assumption is 
excessively optimistic.  The truth-finding efficacy of adversary process depends on both 
sides knowing the truth and having equal access to the same body of evidence.  However, 
these conditions are not likely to hold early in the case before discovery is completed, 
when each side has private information. 
While these points are intuitively plausible, they also find support in the economic 
literature on evidence production.  The classic game-theoretic models that demonstrate 
the truth finding properties of adversarial process assume: (1) that parties will conceal but 
not mislead, (2) that both parties know the truth, and (3) that both parties are able to 
sample from the same evidence distribution.115 The assumption that parties will not 
mislead is extremely naïve, especially when those parties know that a future settlement 
 
115  The classic in the field is an article by Milgrom and Roberts.  Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18 (1986).  Their model assumes that 
the parties cannot fabricate evidence and that both sides know the truth (and know that one another knows 
the truth).  Other contributions to the literature make similar assumptions.  See, e.g., Luke M. Froeb & 
Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naïve, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence, 12 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 257 (1996).  
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could prevent discovery of the lie.116  Moreover, both sides do not necessarily know the 
truth early in the case and neither can sample from the other’s private information before 
conducting discovery.117
To illustrate the problem, consider a judge who is dealing with a reasonably 
complicated construction case.  The parties meet and confer soon after service of the 
complaint as required by Rule 26(f), but are unable to reach agreement on key aspects of 
a discovery plan, including the total number and sequencing of depositions.  The judge 
holds a Rule 16(b) scheduling conference to resolve these issues and frame a scheduling 
order.118
As for the number of depositions, the plaintiff argues that the case is so 
complicated that it should be allowed to exceed the presumptive limit of ten depositions 
prescribed by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.119  The defendant 
responds that, for its part, it is willing to stay within the ten-deposition limit and the 
plaintiff should be able to do so as well by carefully selecting deponents.  The defendant 
insists that plaintiff’s deposition plan will impose high costs on the defendant and that the 
plaintiff has no intention of actually taking all the depositions but just wants to be able to 
threaten onerous deposition discovery in order to force an early settlement.  On the other 
side, the plaintiff argues that defendant’s willingness to accept a deposition limit is purely 
strategic: the plaintiff has very little information that the defendant needs while the 
 
116  See Chris Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L. J. 1215, 1230-1247 (2004) (reviewing the 
data on evidence tampering).  
117  See generally, Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the Economics of Trial: 
Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 365 (2000) (showing how 
asymmetric sampling costs, differences in the information each side can access, or asymmetric stakes can 
bias the ultimate factual determination). 
118  The 16(b) conference varies in degree of formality.  See 3-16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra 
note 18, § 16.11[2][a].  Here we assume the case is complex and contentious enough to warrant a formal 
hearing.  
119  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A). 
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defendant has a great deal of information that the plaintiff needs.  The plaintiff also 
argues that the defendant is trying to restrict deposition discovery in order to impede 
plaintiff’s success at trial and thus extract a more favorable settlement for itself. 
As for sequencing, the plaintiff insists that certain top-level officers of the 
defendant were probably involved deeply in the events and are key sources of 
information, so their depositions should be taken first.  The defendant argues to the 
contrary, that these officers know very little about the case and that the sequencing 
should begin with others.   The defendant insists that the plaintiff wants to use the 
depositions of top officers to create bad publicity for the company and embarrass top 
management into agreeing to an early settlement.  The plaintiff argues in response that 
the defendant wants to delay the key depositions in order to create settlement leverage for 
itself. 
How is the judge supposed to decide these issues?  Rule 16(b) gives her broad 
discretion to decide the sequencing issues, and Rule 30 grants discretion to authorize 
more than ten depositions if the judge finds that additional depositions are “consistent 
with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2).”120  The 26(b)(2) principles, in turn, invite the 
judge to assess the need for additional discovery and balance its costs against its benefits.  
In determining need, the judge is supposed to consider whether the discovery sought is 
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,” whether the plaintiff has already had ample 
opportunity to obtain the information, and whether the discovery could be obtained in a 
less costly manner from some other source.121   In weighing costs and benefits, the judge 
is supposed to take into account “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
 
120  Id. 
121  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(i), (ii). 
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parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”122  
These determinations require a great deal of case-specific information.  Only with 
a fairly good grasp of the facts can the judge reliably assess the “needs of the case” and 
the “amount in controversy” and determine which witnesses are duplicative and which 
will provide significant new information.   The judge might rely to some extent on her 
experience with similar cases, but she will likely be met with strong arguments that the 
particular case before her is different.123   
For example, suppose our judge guesses initially, based on experience with 
construction cases, that the high level officials the plaintiff seeks to depose early probably 
have core information about what was going on with the project.  Expecting this initial 
position, the defendant will be prepared to distinguish its case from the norm.  Ordinarily, 
the judge could rely on the plaintiff to make strong counter-arguments and the adversarial 
interplay to get closer to the truth.  But which officials know what is likely to be the 
defendant’s private information at this early stage, so the plaintiff is not in a good 
position to make a convincing counter-argument. 
This example illustrates an important general point.  When judges make decisions 
early in a case, those decisions can significantly affect settlement bargaining, the efficacy 
of summary judgment and other pretrial options, and the quality of a judgment should the 
case be tried.  To predict these effects, the judge has to know a great deal about the case 
 
122  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). 
123  The judge might hold views of typical party behavior, such as that plaintiffs’ lawyers always 
inflate their need for discovery or defendants’ lawyers always complain about bad publicity.  
Generalizations of this kind are particularly susceptible to cognitive bias, especially when opportunities for 
feedback are limited.  See supra notes 95-106 & accompanying text (discussing the effect of bounded 
rationality factors).  However, in this section, I focus on the information access problem exclusively, so I 
assume that the judge is able to make a perfectly rational decision with sufficient information.  
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and the parties.  However, early in the case, when many of these determinations must be 
made, the parties have little incentive to reveal their private information and strong 
incentives to prevaricate and even mislead.  Concealing information is advantageous 
because it makes the opposing party pay to obtain it, and a strategy of misleading further 
exploits the informational asymmetry.  These information access obstacles interfere with 
one of the main benefits supposedly conferred by procedural discretion – tailoring 
procedures to the unique conditions of the particular case.   
One might argue that the judge in our hypothetical can modify her original 
scheduling order as the litigation progresses, incrementally adjusting and readjusting in 
light of new information and experience with what has already been tried.124  But this 
rosy scenario is excessively optimistic for several reasons.   
First, judges are not in a good position to make the most effective use of an 
incremental approach. This approach works best when the agent is in regular contact with 
the activity and can make adjustments rather smoothly and with little cost.  This is not 
true for judges.  They do not maintain regular contact with lawsuits on their dockets, nor 
can they easily modify their scheduling orders without significant cost.  In fact, 
modification has to be difficult in order for the scheduling order to accomplish one of its 
primary objectives, forcing the parties to proceed expeditiously with pretrial activities 
and settlement negotiations.  If the parties believed at the time a scheduling order was 
entered that modifications would be readily granted ex post, the parties would not invest 
as much in getting a desirable order in the first place or try very hard to meet its deadlines 
and abide by its other requirements. 
 
124  Rule 16(b) allows the trial judge to make modifications “upon a showing of good cause.” 
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 Second, and even more serious, the judge cannot be sure that she will have an 
opportunity to correct her earlier errors before the case settles. The original scheduling 
order or other decision does much more than simply organize and expedite the pretrial 
stage: it frames the parties’ bargaining game and thus influences the ultimate settlement.  
An incremental approach might work reasonably well if all lawsuits went to trial, for then 
the judge could make alterations and correct her earlier planning mistakes.125  But the 
prospect of settlement changes this picture dramatically.  One of the main goals of a Rule 
16 scheduling conference is to encourage early settlement,126 but if the case settles, the 
judge will have no opportunity to modify her order. 
To illustrate this point, return to our construction hypothetical.  Suppose the judge 
accepts the defendant’s position on the number and sequencing of depositions.  Facing a 
ten deposition limit and unable to depose high-level officials early, a rational plaintiff 
should revise its estimate of discovery costs upward and scale back on the estimate of 
trial success.127  These factors should increase the likelihood of a settlement and on terms 
more favorable to the defendant.  If the judge’s decisions are mistaken and the case 
settles soon after the scheduling order, the judge will have no opportunity to correct these 
errors, and the result will be an outcome erroneously skewed in defendant’s favor. 
One might respond to the information access argument by pointing out that judges 
should be able to use standard protocols for different types of cases if pretrial matters fall 
into predictable patterns.  In that case, however, there would be no reason for case-
 
125  It is worth noting that even this happy scenario is not quite as rosy as it seems.  A party might use 
the modification option strategically to impose asymmetric evidence gathering costs and thereby place its 
opponent at a disadvantage for trial   
126  See supra notes 16-23 & accompanying text. 
127  It is worth mentioning as well that if the judge’s pro-defendant decisions are interpreted as a signal 
that the judge might not be favorably disposed to plaintiff’s case as the litigation proceeds, plaintiff’s 
attorney will reduce her estimate of likely success even further. 
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specific discretion.  If cases are sufficiently homogeous to fit a protocol, the better 
approach would be to codify the protocol.  Doing so would ease the burden on trial 
judges and reduce the risk of mistakes.  The reason to rely on trial judge discretion is to 
address the special cases that do not readily fit a protocol.  But it is in these cases that the 
trial judge is likely to have difficulty accessing case-specific information.128
This then is the informational advantage rulemaking has over case-specific 
discretion: rulemakers are better situated to gather and process empirical information on 
broad classes of cases and design general rules for the average case.  If a group of cases is 
too heterogeneous for a single rule, the group can be divided into more homogeneous 
subgroups and different rules designed for different subgroups.  To be sure, there is a 
limit to this approach.  At some point, the cost of subdividing further – both the cost of 
gathering and processing the necessary information when making the rule and the cost of 
assigning a case to the right category when applying the rule – exceeds the benefit of 
more refined rules.129  This represents the point of optimal subdivision, and rulemakers 
should resist efforts to subdivide further.130
3. Strategic Effects – The Judge as a Strategic Player 
The traditional view of the judge as passive umpire does not fit a procedural 
system pervaded by case-specific discretion.  When the trial judge adapts procedures to 
specific cases, she almost inevitably becomes another strategic player in the litigation 
                                                 
128  See Yeazell, Judging Rules, supra note 14, at 241-42 (noting another reason why information 
access is limited – much of what happens at the pretrial stage takes place outside the judge’s view). 
129  See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 
590-592 (1992). 
130  The proposal assumes that there are reasonably effective criteria for sorting cases.  One must 
remember, however, that sorting need not be perfect.  The goal is to minimize total costs: the error and 
process costs of case-specific discretion must be compared to the error and process costs of imperfect rules. 
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game.131   Imagine a baseball umpire who has discretion to decide how many strikes or 
outs to allow or to decide whether a runner has to tag third base before heading home on 
a fly ball.  The umpire’s discretion would make him a player in the game, for then each 
team would try to influence the umpire’s decisions at the same time as he tried to 
influence theirs. 
The judicial shift from umpire to strategic player is most apparent for settlement 
promotion and case management.  The whole point of those activities is to influence 
party behavior.  To be effective, the judge must predict party response and adjust her 
decisions accordingly.  At the same time, the parties know that the judge will do this, so 
each behaves in a way that tries to induce an optimal response from the judge (for that 
party).  But it does not stop there.  The judge knows that parties will react in this way, so 
the judge takes account of that possibility in advance.  And so on.132
The fact that judges often act strategically is important for two reasons.  First, 
even perfectly rational actors with complete information sometimes have trouble 
achieving good outcomes in a strategic environment, as the game-theoretic literature 
demonstrates. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is perhaps the most famous example.133  The 
players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game have complete information but still end up with a 
bad result, because they are unable to commit to cooperative strategies in advance.  
Second, it is naïve to assume that trial judges can use their discretionary management 
 
131  For a critical analysis of discretionary judicial case management that recognizes the way it 
transforms the judicial role and some of the resulting strategic costs, especially for attorney behavior and 
settlement quality, see Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 1, at 1003-05, 1019-29.  
132  This description is a standard account of strategic interaction.  See RASMUSEN, supra note 90, at 9-
10.   When choosing a strategy, each player must consider how her choice will affect other players, taking 
account that the other players will do the same to her.  So from the perspective of any given player, every 
other player is a moving target.  The trick to predicting what will happen is to find a set of mutual best 
responses, which is called an “equilibrium.”  See infra note 141 (describing the Nash equilibrium). 
133  On the Prisoners’ Dilemma, see DOUGLAS A. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994).  
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tools to overcome these obstacles.  Again, the game theoretic literature shows that efforts 
to solve problems in a strategic environment often produce new problems that can make 
matters even worse. 
Proceduralists are not accustomed to thinking of judges as strategic players.  
Even the critics of settlement promotion and case management, while perhaps influenced 
by a lingering sense that it is inappropriate for a judge to act strategically, mostly ignore 
the strategic dimension.   Moreover, there is very little empirical work on judges as 
strategic actors,134 and most of the theoretical literature on the economics of litigation 
focuses on the strategic interaction between parties and treats the judge as a detached 
decisionmaker simply reacting to party behavior.135
This Article is not the place to analyze the detailed effects of judicial strategic 
behavior.   Doing so is far too complicated, and the effects will vary with different 
contexts in any event.  Still, it is possible to illustrate in general what might happen.  The 
following concrete example is highly stylized and simpler than any actual litigation 
scenario.  Yet it is sufficiently realistic to highlight the way strategic interaction can 
complicate any effort to manage litigation.  The central problem is that the parties are 
moving targets.  If the judge decides to do X on the assumption that the parties will do A, 
 
134  Most of the empirical work is in the political science literature, and much of it focuses on the 
United States Supreme Court’s interaction with Congress and administrative agencies.  See, e.g., LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); CORNELL W. CLAYTON & HOWARD 
GILLMAN, SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES (1999).  This literature 
examines whether Supreme Court Justices decide cases strategically. A Justice who thinks strategically on 
this view would decide the case in a way that is not ideal given her own policy preferences, but that is 
likely to yield an ultimate outcome closer to her ideal after other governmental entities, such as Congress or 
administrative agencies, respond.  However, these other entities know that the Justices will do this, so they 
react in ways that try to influence decisions that are easier for those entities to deal with or more likely to 
yield an ultimate result closer to their (the entities’) policy preferences.  
135  More precisely, the game theoretic models treat a judicial decision or trial as a random event (like 
the flip of a coin) with exogenously fixed probabilities assigned to each possible result.  This means that the 
judge and jury cannot influence, or be influenced by, the parties’ behavior and therefore are not players in 
the game.   
Procedural Discretion  Page 46 
 
 
                                                
then the parties, anticipating that the judge will do X, might change from A to B, 
frustrating what the judge hoped to accomplish with X.  
Imagine a tort suit involving a single plaintiff and a single corporate defendant 
and a judge who is trying to conduct the lawsuit so as to produce an optimal settlement or 
trial judgment taking account of error and process costs.  Suppose that early in the case 
the judge must decide whether to refer the lawsuit to mediation.136  The judge’s decision 
will turn on a number of characteristics of the suit, some of which will be apparent to the 
judge and some of which will not.  One of the hidden characteristics has to do with how 
contentious the parties truly are.137  Mediation is much less likely to work for highly 
contentious parties, but judges cannot determine contentiousness directly.  They can only 
infer whether a party is truly contentious by observing the party’s behavior. 
Suppose that our corporate defendant is not truly contentious and would actually 
cooperate if the case were referred to mediation.138  However, the defendant would rather 
the case not be referred because it believes that its superior resources and ability to 
handle risk give it a comparative advantage in ordinary litigation and thus improve its 
chance of obtaining a favorable settlement.  Under these circumstances, our defendant (or 
 
136  For a strategic analysis of the effect of hidden information on mediation and the tools a mediator 
might use to reduce adverse selection problems, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic 
Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 331-71 (1994).  The authors focus on the process of 
mediation itself and their recommendations, especially sequential caucusing, would be difficult for a judge 
to implement on her own, especially a judge without a lot of mediation training.  For a strategic account of 
court-annexed arbitration that can be adapted to include the judge as a strategic party, see Lisa Bernstein, 
Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration 
Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993). 
137  Other hidden characteristics include each party’s valuation of the case, each party’s bargaining 
power, and the relative risk aversion.  I could run the example for each of these characteristics with similar 
results.  
138  There are a number of reasons why the defendant would cooperate.  The defendant might decide 
that settlement is better than prolonging the litigation when prolonging also includes paying for mediation, 
or it might be concerned about judicial hostility if it resists mediation after the judge orders it.  Indeed, the 
judge might have a reputation for punishing parties that do not cooperate in mediation when the case 
returns to regular litigation.  Furthermore, the judge might take active steps to cultivate this reputation by 
being hard on parties who resist mediation after it is ordered. 
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more precisely its lawyer) might act strategically by behaving contentiously at an early 
hearing in an attempt to deceive the judge into believing that it is in fact contentious 
(when it is not).    
What is the judge supposed to do when she observes the defendant being 
contentious, but also knows that the defendant might be trying to deceive her?  At one 
extreme, the judge might just take the behavior at face value and never send a case to 
mediation when the defendant behaves contentiously.  At the other extreme, she might 
assume every contentiously behaving defendant is faking and send all cases to mediation.   
Neither of these extreme approaches is optimal, however.  If the judge always refused to 
send a case to mediation whenever the defendant behaved contentiously, defendants 
would always behave contentiously and escape mediation, a costly result that gives 
defendants a great deal of power and undermines the goals of court-annexed mediation.  
On the other hand, if the judge always ordered mediation without any concern for 
defendant’s behavior, truly contentious defendants would end up in mediation, thereby 
creating wasted costs when mediation proves unsuccessful.139
It is possible to construct a formal game-theoretic model of this strategic 
interaction and solve for a Nash equilibrium.140 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, 
 
139  Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult for the judge to stick with an always-refer-to-
mediation strategy.  If the judge always referred cases to mediation, there would be no reason for 
cooperative defendants to fake contentiousness, as they would gain nothing from doing so.  Thus, only truly 
contentious defendants would behave contentiously.  But then the trial judge, observing a defendant 
behaving contentiously, would have to conclude that the defendant must be truly contentious, in which case 
the judge would be sorely tempted to deviate from her always-refer-to-mediation strategy and not refer the 
case.  And if the judge did that, then the cooperative defendants would revert to pretending to be 
contentious – and the cycle would start all over again.   More generally, beliefs and actions must be 
rationally consistent in equilibrium: each player’s beliefs about how the other will act must be consistent 
with how the other actually does act.  In our mediation example, this means that a rational judge must 
refuse to refer when she believes that every contentiously behaving defendant is truly contentious.  See 
BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 126-130 (illustrating this point). 
140  See id. at 19-28 (explaining the Nash Equilibrium). 
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one for each player, such that when each player plays its equilibrium strategy it does the 
best it can given that other players play their equilibrium strategies.141  In the equilibrium 
of our mediation-referral game, the judge sometimes – but not always – refers cases to 
mediation when the defendant behaves contentiously, and cooperative defendants 
sometimes – but not always – pretend to be contentious.142
The judge knows that a defendant who behaves cooperatively is not truly 
contentious, but she does not know whether a defendant who behaves contentiously is 
truly contentious or just pretending.  As a result, some cases will go to mediation that 
should not (i.e. cases involving truly contentious defendants that the court sends to 
mediation by mistake), and some cases will be directed away from mediation that should 
have been referred (i.e. cases involving truly cooperative defendants faking 
contentiousness that the court declines to send to mediation by mistake).   Both types of 
mistake are costly.  Indeed, the social costs in this equilibrium might even exceed those 
generated when judges act non-strategically by naively accepting the defendant’s conduct 
as genuine.143
 
141  Consider a game between players A and B.   Suppose that if A uses strategy X, B’s best response 
is strategy Y.  Suppose the converse is also true: if B uses strategy Y, A’s best response is strategy X.   X 
and Y then are mutual best responses.  If A plays X, B plays Y; and if B plays Y, A plays X.  This means 
that neither A nor B has an incentive to deviate once they start playing X and Y. We say the Nash 
equilibrium of this game consists of A playing X and B playing Y and that the outcome of the game is the 
result that follows when the two strategies are played against one another.  
142  Technically, the strategy of never referring contentious-appearing defendants to mediation can be 
part of an equilibrium only if most defendants who behave contentiously are in fact not faking.  If instead 
most are faking – and the incentives to fake would be very high when faking is always successful – the 
refusal strategy misses too many opportunities for successful mediation.  Also, for the reasons discussed in 
note 139 supra, always referring contentious-appearing defendants to mediation cannot be part of an 
equilibrium either.  Thus, the equilibrium must consist of mixed strategies, where the judge acts one way 
sometimes and the other way the rest of the time.  See RASMUSEN, supra note 90, at 67-83 (explaining 
mixed strategies).  
143  Whether the total costs are greater depends on the relative costs of the two types of error 
(mistakenly referring and mistakenly not referring) and the relative number of truly contentious defendants. 
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There are many other situations like this.  For example, a judge might decide to be 
tough against plaintiffs and generous to moving party defendants at the summary 
judgment stage in order to deter the filing of weak cases.  The prospect of facing a hostile 
judge at summary judgment then might deter the filing of meritorious suits, or more 
likely, cause plaintiffs to settle prior to summary judgment on terms favorable to 
defendants. 
It is important to recognize that in all these examples social costs are created even 
though the judge is a purely public-regarding actor who does everything she can to 
further legitimate procedural policies and goals.  Recall that our hypothetical judge cared 
about producing quality settlements, which is one of the reasons she was so concerned 
about sending the right cases to mediation.  Suppose, however, that the judge’s utility 
function is such that she cares much more about the quantity of settlements than their 
quality.  In that case, the judge might prefer not to refer some cooperative defendants 
even when she knows they are cooperative.  If the additional leverage of ordinary 
litigation increases the chance that the plaintiff will capitulate and capitulate sooner than 
in mediation, then the judge might prefer to keep the case in litigation.  The resulting 
equilibrium would change: fewer cooperative defendants would pretend to be 
contentious; more cases involving cooperative defendants would remain in ordinary 
litigation, generating higher costs, and there would be more bad settlements involving 
cooperative defendants.144
 
144  Matters only get worse if we assume a judicial utility function that also includes private values.  
Suppose, for example, that a judge’s political views lead her to be suspicious of civil rights plaintiffs.  Civil 
rights lawyers expecting a hostile reception will adopt strategies that try to prevent it, say, by falsely 
portraying the facts in their particular cases as especially egregious.  The judge will anticipate these 
strategies and adopt counterstrategies to minimize the effects.  The resulting strategic interaction can 
produce bad outcomes in a number of different ways. 
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Insofar as strategic effects are concerned, the advisory committee process has an 
advantage over the trial judge since committee rulemakers are detached from the 
intensely strategic fray of individual litigation.  To be sure, they are involved in other 
types of strategic interaction, such as with the practising bar, private interest groups, and 
Congress, but those interactions are likely to be less intense, more diffuse, and potentially 
more manageable.145  For example, rulemakers are in a better position than individual 
trial judges to gather information, which should mitigate the adverse strategic effects of 
asymmetric information.  Moreover, a particular rule might be good for an interest group 
in some cases and bad in others, which makes strategizing for private benefit more 
difficult at the rulemaking stage than in an individual suit.  And public-regarding 
rulemakers should be able to resist lobbying pressures to a considerable extent.  
V. Limiting Procedural Discretion
Let us recap the argument so far.   We have seen that case-specific discretion is a 
defining feature of modern federal procedure, and for reasons that have little to do with 
its efficacy.  We then examined the efficacy question directly.  We first defined the goal 
that judges should aim to achieve when they design procedures for a specific case, which 
is to strike an optimal balance between achieving good judgments and achieving good 
settlements.  We then examined how effectively trial judges armed with case-specific 
discretion can achieve this goal working within a tightly integrated system of procedure, 
and we identified three major obstacles to success. 
This much should be enough to shake any naïve confidence in trial judge 
discretion.  The lesson is clear:  Rulemakers should treat case-specific discretion as an 
                                                 
145  See Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, at 921-926 (describing the advantages of a court-based, 
committee-centered rulemaking process).  
Procedural Discretion  Page 51 
 
 
explicit policy choice rather than an implicit default, evaluate its costs and benefits in 
each procedural context, and make a considered judgment about how much discretion to 
grant and what controls or guidelines to include. 
As the literature on rules versus standards teaches, there are many factors relevant 
to this analysis, including the administrative costs of formulating rules in advance, the 
error costs of applying rules strictly (given the inevitable over- and under-inclusion), the 
administrative and error costs of case-specific discretionary decisions, and so on.146  
These factors, however, have different implications for procedure than for substantive 
law because of the highly strategic nature of the litigation environment, the tightly 
systemic character of procedural rules, and the special challenges facing judges when 
they try strike an optimal balance between settlement and judgment effects.   The 
following discussion develops these points by considering four different ways discretion 
can be limited and illustrating each with concrete rule reforms. 
A. Eliminating Discretion (As Much As Possible)
 One approach is to impose a strict rule that (virtually) strips trial judges of all 
case-specific discretion.  Even strict rules must be interpreted, of course, and 
interpretation introduces some flexibility.147  Yet language is not so indeterminate that 
relatively clear and strict rules cannot be drafted.148  Furthermore, one should not assume 
                                                 
146  See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995); Kaplow, supra note 129; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974).   
147  Professor Sunstein argues that the possibility of an exceptional case always makes it necessary for 
judges to formulate ex post normative judgments interpreting a rule.  See Sunstein, supra note 146, at 984-
987.  However, the point of a strict procedural rule strictly enforced is that trial judges do not make the 
exceptions; rather, the rulemaking committee decides whether an exception is warranted.  
148  See SCHAUER, supra note 146, at 214. 
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that trial judges will routinely ignore clear rules when they understand why strict 
enforcement is necessary and appellate courts actively review every opportunity they get. 
Some current rules leave no (or very little) room for case-specific discretion.  A 
notable example are the rules governing pleading specificity.  The United States Supreme 
Court has made clear that trial judges cannot tailor stricter pleading standards to the 
circumstances of specific cases, such as by requiring more factual specificity to control 
for a higher risk of frivolous suits.149  Trial judges instead must apply a liberal notice 
pleading standard unless a Federal Rule or congressional statute provides otherwise.150  
The Supreme Court justified its holding as an interpretation of the Federal Rules,151 but 
given the vague and flexible language of the Federal Rules governing pleading,152 it is 
 
149  Whatever residual uncertainty might have remained after Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) was virtually eliminated by Swierkewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506 (2002).   The recent case of Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.,237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Pelman I), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Pelman II) is a good example of judicial 
tailoring. The Pelman plaintiffs filed a consumer class action for damages, alleging that McDonald’s sales 
practices encouraged children to eat too much fatty and unhealthy food.   In Pelman I, the district judge 
granted defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to plead elements of 
their claims with sufficient factual specificity.  The judge’s published opinion reads as if he on his own 
decided stricter pleading was appropriate for the particular case because of the risk and burden of frivolous 
litigation.  See Pelman I, supra, at 518.  The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, and the judge once 
again dismissed on the ground of insufficient specificity, this time with prejudice.  Pelman II, supra, at 
*40-*41. The Second Circuit reversed as to some claims on the strength of Swierkewicz, supra, holding that 
the plaintiffs need only satisfy a liberal notice pleading standard.  Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 
508, 511-12 (2d Cir. 2005). 
150  See Swierkewicz, supra, at 512-14; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  But see Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (suggesting alternatives to a 12(b)(6) motion that would seem to 
circumvent liberal notice pleading indirectly).  An example of a Federal Rule authorizing strict pleading is 
Rule 9(b) (“the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity)” and an 
example of a statute doing so is the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (“the 
complaint shall…state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted” 
with the state of mind required by the claim). 
151  See Leatherman, supra, at 168.   The Court argued that since the rule drafters went to the trouble 
of expressly requiring strict pleading for fraud and mistake in Rule 9(b), they must have meant Rule 8(a)(2) 
to be very generous notice pleading.    
152  The language of the rules is consistent with considerable case-specific tailoring.  For example, 
Rule 9(b) might be interpreted as simply an effort to be clear about certain issues without excluding stricter 
pleading for others.  Moreover, one can easily interpret Rule 8(a)(2)’s somewhat vague language – “short 
and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief” – to support more detail for elements that are 
more difficult to infer from highly general allegations.  See, e.g., Richard A. Marcus, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1749, 1755 (1998). In fact, lower courts prior to 
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reasonable to assume that the Court was also influenced by an implicit policy judgment 
that pleading specificity is a matter better handled by rulemaking committees (and 
Congress) than by individual trial judges.153    
It is instructive to examine why such a policy judgment might make sense for 
pleading because the same reasons apply to other rules as well.   The choice of pleading 
specificity standard involves balancing two conflicting goals: screening frivolous suits 
(which favors stricter pleading) versus facilitating meritorious suits (which favors more 
liberal notice pleading).154  It follows that one should reject trial judge discretion in favor 
of a general rule if one believed that rulemaking committees (and Congress) were in a 
superior position to strike the optimal policy balance. 
The Advisory Committee has substantial advantages in this regard (as does 
Congress).  The Committee is in a much better position than the trial judge to collect and 
process empirical data on the likelihood of frivolous suits for different types of litigation.   
In addition, adopting a clear pleading rule in advance provides notice to prospective 
plaintiffs about what they need to plead.  It is certainly possible to implement a pleading 
standard after the fact through amendments to the complaint, but an amendment process 
consumes litigation resources.   
Furthermore, striking the optimal policy balance involves much more than 
estimating the frequency of frivolous suits; it also involves comparing the costs of 
 
Leatherman, supra, interpreted these Rules to allow trial judges to fashion stricter pleading rules for 
particular types of cases. See, e.g., Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Supp. 892 (1991). 
153  See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“our cases demonstrate that questions 
regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved 
either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process). 
154  See supra note 93.   
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mistakenly screening meritorious suits with the costs of allowing frivolous suits.155  This 
comparison can implicate controversial value judgments, especially when the litigation 
involves strong public interests, as in civil rights cases.  Arguably, these value judgments 
are more legitimately made through an open and public participatory process like the one 
that the Advisory Committee uses to draft the Federal Rules.156   
Finally, the choice of optimal pleading rule is part of a much larger problem of 
designing an integrated system of rules that deals as a whole with the frivolous suit 
problem optimally.  This means that pleading rules should be evaluated in conjunction 
with other devices for reducing frivolous suits, such as Rule 11 sanctions, summary 
judgment, fee shifting, and discovery controls.157  Judges who tailor specificity standards 
to individual cases are not in a good position to adopt such a global perspective, but the 
Advisory Committee is.  
The pleading example is meant to illustrate the kind of analysis that should be 
undertaken and some of the factors that should be considered when the Advisory 
Committee decides whether to delegate case-specific discretion or instead use a strict rule 
approach.  My second example – discovery – involves an area in which trial judges 
currently exercise “enormous discretionary power”158 and in which a strict rule might 
well be superior.159  The advantage of strict discovery rules has to do with the benefits of 
 
155  See BONE, ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at 130-132. 
156  See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c). 
157  See Leatherman, supra, at 168-69. 
158  Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 47, at 651-52. 
159  But see Stempel, supra note 3, at 232-234 (recommending eliminating even the presumptive limits 
and restoring broad case-specific discretion over discovery). 
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facilitating credible pre-commitment in the complex high-stakes, high-conflict cases that 
generate most of the discovery problems.160
Sometimes parties are better off when they can firmly commit in advance to a 
course of conduct and strip themselves of the freedom to change their minds later on.161  
The classic example from literature is Ulysses, who had his men tie him to the mast so he 
could avoid the Sirens’ call.  An example from game theory is the Prisoners’ Dilemma, in 
which both parties end up better off in equilibrium when they can credibly commit in 
advance to cooperate.162
One likely reason litigating parties engage in excessive and abusive discovery is 
that they are locked into a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, fearful that their opponent will 
abuse discovery and gain a litigating advantage.163  For example, each side has an 
incentive to spend more than it otherwise would out of fear that the other side will 
overspend and gain a marginal advantage at trial.  Furthermore, each side has an 
incentive to withhold discovery to exploit a relative cost advantage by forcing the other 
 
160  See Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the 
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599-603 (1998) (noting that problems 
are confined to a relatively small group of high-stakes, high-conflict cases). 
161  For an intriguing account of different situations in which parties benefit from their ability to 
precommit, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 1-87 (2000). 
162  See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 33.  
163  See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 571-
78 (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict 
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-522 (1994); Setear, supra, note 91, at 584-
593.  But see Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
1618, 1623-24 (1996) (questioning the Prisoners’ Dilemma account and treating discovery abuse as a 
problem of moral development).  There are other reasons in addition to the Prisoners’ Dilemma.  For 
example, lawyers hired on a fee-for-services basis have incentives to overdo discovery in order to run up 
fees; see, e.g., Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills, 25 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 249, 258-59 (1993); and risk-averse young associates in large law firms might err on the side of 
excessive discovery out of fear that doing too little and overlooking something could elicit the wrath of 
more senior attorneys; cf. Yablon, supra, at 1639.  Strict limits will do a better job than presumptive limits 
in controlling these incentives.  Presumptive limits invite motions that run up costs and encourage young 
associates to seek more discovery.  Some commentators point to cost-externalization as another factor.  See 
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 62-68.  The optimal solution is to internalize the external costs, but 
setting strict limits also helps by limiting opportunities to externalize. 
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side to bring motions to compel.  And each side might be inclined by the same dynamic 
to conduct abusive discovery with no informational value, intended only to increase its 
opponent’s costs and thereby leverage a more favorable settlement.164  If one side expects 
the other to do any of these things, it will do them as well so as to avoid ending up a 
“sucker.”165
However, if both sides invest more in discovery than they ordinarily would 
simply to counter anticipated investments by the other side, the result will be wasteful 
expenditures on litigation.166  Consequently, both parties should be willing to commit in 
advance not to overspend if only they could do so in a binding way, for then each would 
save the litigation costs of responding to its opponent’s overspending.  The problem, 
however, is that without some way to make commitments binding, each party has an 
incentive to renege on its promise not to overspend.167  Strict rules strictly enforced do 
the same work as a binding commitment and thus solve the collective action problem 
when parties are unable to do so on their own.  On the other hand, strict rules are 
 
164  See Setear, supra note 91, at 581.  More precisely, the favorable settlement effects result from 
being able to credibly threaten to impose abusive discovery, but the party making the threat must actually 
engage in abusive discovery sometimes in order to make the threat credible. 
165  See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 163, at 514-522. 
166  There is another strategic possibility.  There is reason to believe, both on empirical and theoretical 
grounds, that when one party (A) knows the other (B) will adopt an aggressive strategy, the optimal 
response for A is to adopt a strategy of retreat rather than counter-aggression as the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
theory assumes.  See Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 127 (1988); George B. Shepherd, The Economics of Pretrial Discovery: An Empirical Study, 19 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 245, 259-60 (1999).  The reason is complicated, but the intuition is easy to explain.  
It is not necessarily rational for both parties to be aggressive in equilibrium because being aggressive is 
costly and mutual aggression cancels out.  This means that one party will be aggressive and the other party 
will retreat.  These equilibrium strategies make sense.  When A adopts a strategy of retreat, B counters by 
adopting a less aggressive strategy because A’s retreat reduces the marginal benefit of additional 
aggression – and vice versa.  The new equilibrium is still problematic, however.  When one side is 
aggressive as the other retreats, the more aggressive party has a stronger threat point in settlement 
bargaining, so any settlement is likely to be skewed in its favor.  Once again, strict discovery limits mitigate 
the adverse effects by limiting the opportunity for aggression. 
167  Consider two parties, P and D.  P will renege if it believes that D will not, because then P gets to  
take advantage of D, who will end up a “sucker.”  P will also renege if it believes that D will do so too, 
because then P avoids being a “sucker” itself.  Thus, P will renege no matter what D does.  And the same is 
true for D.    
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necessarily imprecise, and the inevitable under- and over-inclusion creates social costs 
that must be balanced against the benefits of pre-commitment.168  
To illustrate, consider quantity limits on discovery.  The Federal Rules limit the 
total number of depositions and interrogatories.169  Some local district rules limit the 
number of requests for admission, and some also limit the number of document 
requests.170   All these limits are presumptive: the trial judge has discretion to permit 
additional discovery if the parties show that more is needed.171
The idea of including express numerical limits is sound, but making them 
presumptive and thus allowing exceptions undermines the strictness of the rule and 
interferes with the ability of parties to credibly pre-commit.  Of course, the extent of 
interference depends on how readily trial judges grant exceptions, and it is difficult to 
know for sure how often this happens.  However, there is reason to believe that it is not 
an uncommon practice.  It would be hard for a judge to resist granting an exception in the 
face of a showing of need when she thinks that rejecting the request risks a meritorious 
case losing at trial.  Moreover, many trial judges were once trial lawyers themselves and 
are likely to empathize with attorneys and exercise leniency.172  In fact, if it turned out 
that trial judges actually granted exceptions only rarely, that fact would tend to support a 
strict rule, since a strict rule would get it right virtually all the time and also save the 
litigation costs of determining individual exceptions. 
 
168  See Sunstein, supra note 146, at 992-993. 
169  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (limiting depositions to 10), 33(a) (limiting interrogatories to 25). 
170  See, e.g., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, Rule 26.1(C) (limiting document requests to two separate sets and requests for admission 
to 25). 
171  Even the limits imposed by the District of Massachusetts Local Rule are presumptive.  See LOCAL 
RULE 26.2(B).  
172  See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 65 (1997).  
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Thus, strict discovery limits have major advantages compared to presumptive 
limits.  Strict limits make it possible for parties to commit in advance and achieve the 
superior equilibrium.  The limits must be strict because the trial judge is also a player in 
the game.  If the trial judge has power to grant exceptions, the parties will act 
strategically to persuade the judge to give an exception.  In other words, strict limits are 
beneficial not only because they tie the hands of the parties, but also because they tie the 
hands of the judge. 
Admittedly, this is not the only way to accomplish the result.  One might instead 
rely on deterring abuse with sanctions,173 or rely on the parties to stipulate to discovery 
limits on their own. 174  There are problems with each of these alternatives.  As for the 
sanctioning option, the problems include difficulties detecting abuse, legal and practical 
obstacles to effective sanctioning, and the high costs of sanctioning hearings.175  Also, 
sanctioning relies on the judge to be tough when experience shows that few judges are 
willing to be tough except in extreme cases.176  As for the stipulation option, stipulations 
can be difficult to negotiate in an adversarial setting and difficult to enforce, and as with 
presumptive limits, judges will be tempted to grant exceptions.177
 
173  Parties can be sanctioned in federal court for conducting excessive or abusive discovery.  See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
174  See FED. R. CIV. P. 29. 
175  If judges could reliably detect instances of discovery abuse and always imposed sanctions harsh 
enough to deter the practice, parties would not do it.   However, it is difficult for a judge to distinguish 
between abuse and an honest effort to obtain information helpful for trial, and judges are often required to 
do an ex post balancing of actual prejudice and justification when deciding on a sanction and the 
uncertainty of this balance dilutes the deterrent effect of the sanction. 
176  See Beckerman, supra note 163, at 571-78; Carrington, supra note 172, at 65; Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to 
Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem”, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 85 (1994). 
177  It is significant in this regard that Rule 29 appears to be used only in rather limited situations.  See 
Setear, supra note 91, at 590. 
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There are disadvantages to strict limits.  The main problem with a general rule 
imposing strict limits across-the-board is that it is under-inclusive and over-inclusive.  
For example, the current limit of ten depositions might not “fit” all cases well; some 
particularly complicated cases might require more than ten for the parties to prepare 
adequately for trial.178  However, the magnitude of this problems depends on the 
heterogeneity of the population of cases to which the strict rule applies, and one way to 
reduce heterogeneity is to divide the population into more homogeneous subgroups and 
adopt different rules for each subgroup based on past experience with discovery in the 
different types of cases.   
This categorical approach creates its own costs.  Identifying the proper groups 
requires empirical information and careful analysis.179  Moreover, the categories must be 
defined with sufficient clarity so that the costs of identifying the right category and 
applying the correct rule are not too high.  Even so, it should be possible to reduce the 
costs of over- and under-inclusion by using this approach.180
It is also worth mentioning that heterogeneity might not be as costly as it seems at 
first glance.181  Because most cases settle, the most important question is how strict limits 
affect settlement.  As long as both sides are able to obtain core information within the 
 
178  Moreover, some cases might require fewer and this can create problems too.  Parties free to take 
additional depositions might threaten to do so just to increase their opponents’ costs.  
179  And can be difficult.  See KAKALIK ET AL., EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, 
at xxiii; Marcus, supra note 78, at 778. 
180    The optimal set of categories depends on balancing the costs of formulating and applying a more 
refined set of rules against the costs of applying a single rule to a heterogeneous group.  Furthermore, if a 
refined category includes only a small number of cases, the benefits might not be large enough to justify the 
investment necessary to devise a good rule for that category, especially if doing so requires costly empirical 
and normative analysis.  See Kaplow, supra note 129, at 580-581.  I assume, however, that any sensible 
schema will leave plenty of cases to adjudicate in each category. 
181  In addition to the point about settlement discussed in the text, it is worth noting that a strict limit is 
not likely to have any effect in most cases, since most cases involve very little, if any, discovery under the 
current system.  See Garth, supra note 160, at 599-603.  Thus, it should be possible to set a strict limit that 
provides ample discovery opportunities for most cases while controlling for abuse in the relatively small 
number of high-stakes, high-conflict cases.  
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discovery limits (and doing this might require careful discovery planning), they should be 
able to reach a good settlement in many cases without access to more marginal (albeit 
still relevant) information.  Settlements are based on predictions about trial outcome and 
core information should be enough to support sufficiently reliable predictions in many 
cases.182
 Finally, the benefits and costs of strict limits must be compared to the benefits 
and costs of presumptive limits.  The principal benefit of the presumptive approach is that 
it gives the trial judge an opportunity to fit discovery more closely to the needs of the 
case as the litigation proceeds and the judge learns more.  However, the magnitude of this 
benefit depends on how effectively the judge can make case-specific adjustments, and 
there is reason to believe that her effectiveness is seriously limited, as we saw in Part 
IV.183   On the cost side of the ledger, presumptive limits sacrifice the benefits of pre-
commitment and also increase litigation costs by adding an extra layer of hearings and 
deliberations to decide discovery motions. 
There are two important points to take from this discussion.  First, it appears that 
on balance some type of strict limits approach might well be superior to the presumptive 
limits in the current Rules.  Second, and more important, the Advisory Committee should 
explicitly consider which approach is optimal and in particular whether a strict rule is 
superior to case-specific discretion when strict limits promise pre-commitment or other 
 
182  Moreover, so long as the parties are not too risk-averse, any residual error should not seriously 
impair settlement quality if the error is symmetrically distributed about the expected trial award, for then 
the errors will cancel out in expectation.   
183  See Setear, supra note 91, at 593 (noting the information access obstacle to effective judicial 
management of discovery); Beckerman, supra note 163, at 567-68 (same). 
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benefits.184  Strict limits generate outcome errors, to be sure, but so do presumptive limits 
when trial judges make mistakes on a case-specific basis. 
B.  Narrowing the Range of Discretion
Another way to contain discretion is to limit the range of options available to the 
judge.  Whether this is a sensible approach depends on its costs and benefits, which will 
vary with different procedural contexts.  In this section, I use the example of judicial 
settlement promotion to illustrate the method.  A comprehensive analysis of this difficult 
and controversial issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is possible to give a brief 
treatment sufficient to indicate what is at stake.  Even this brief treatment supports 
restricting judicial settlement options and relying much more on general rules. 
1. The Benefits and Costs of Settlement Promotion 
 
Settlement has many benefits.185  It saves litigation costs, reduces delay costs for 
parties in other cases, and gives needy plaintiffs compensation sooner and at a time when 
they can make better use of it.  In addition, the fact that settlements require consent 
makes it more likely that party preferences will be satisfied and enhances the likelihood 
of cooperation at the enforcement stage.  Finally, settlements offer remedial flexibility, 
making it possible for parties to design remedies that fit the particularities of their 
individual disputes.186
                                                 
184  There are other possibilities intermediate between strict and presumptive limits.  For example, a 
general rule might create a presumptive limit but give the judge only a single opportunity to override it and 
also confine that opportunity to an early stage of the litigation, such as the initial scheduling conference.  
This way the judge would be able to make adjustments but only once so as not to sacrifice too much by 
way of pre-commitment benefits.  Whether this intermediate approach is better than strict limits depends on 
how effectively the trial judge can make adjustments early and the additional litigation costs created by 
permitting it. 
185  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory 
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 486-490 (1985). 
186  Id. at 504-506.  
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Settlement also generates costs, and discretionary judicial involvement in 
settlement promotion is likely to exacerbate the costs.  The following discussion focuses 
on strategic and agency costs because they are likely to be the most serious.187
Judicial involvement can create high strategic costs when parties are in a position 
to exploit judicial settlement pressure to gain a bargaining advantage.  An example is the 
frivolous suit.  Since a frivolous suit by definition is unlikely to win at trial, most 
frivolous suits are filed in order to force settlements.  Judicial pressure to settle plays into 
the hands of the frivolous plaintiff by making it more difficult for the defendant to hold 
out for trial.188  Settlement pressure can also have adverse strategic effects in meritorious 
suits.  For example, a defendant might avoid revealing private information damaging to 
its case by pretending to be innocent and relying on judicial pressure to force the plaintiff 
to settle early before discovery leads to disclosure.  Also, settlement pressure can interact 
with unequal bargaining power to create outcomes systematically skewed in favor of 
wealthy and more powerful parties.189  
 
187  There are other types of cost.  Judicial involvement in settlement promotion adds administrative 
costs. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 493-94; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: 
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1364-71, 1388-89 (1994) 
(noting that additional administrative costs might exceed the trial savings, given that most cases settle 
anyway).  In addition, some critics argue that settlement depletes precedent, erodes the expressive value of 
adjudication, and undermines the moral authority of the courts.  See, e.g., H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is 
Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431 (1986); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public 
Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984).  
However, it is difficult to assess these effects without a more precise idea of how much precedent is needed 
to support a healthy common law system, what is entailed in expressive value, and how much expressive 
value adjudication adds beyond what other social institutions already provide.  See Shavell, supra note 86, 
at 606. 
188  To be sure, a trial judge would not push for settlement in a suit she knew was frivolous, but given 
information obstacles, it is extremely difficult to verify frivolousness at an early stage. 
189  See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 187, at 1076-78.  Corporate defendants and insurers in particular have 
considerable experience with settlement negotiation and opportunities as repeat players to exert strategic 
leverage unavailable to a one-shot litigant.  For example, a repeat player is in a better position than a one-
shot litigant to develop a reputation for hard bargaining, and with such a reputation the repeat player can 
capture more of the settlement surplus. 
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Judicial pressure to settle can also exacerbate agency costs.  Agency costs in this 
context refer to the costs created when an attorney serves her own private interests at the 
expense of her client.190  Settlement is a particularly fertile environment for self-serving 
behavior because settlement negotiations take place in private, settlement amounts are 
usually kept confidential, and few clients have the sophistication or expertise to monitor 
for abuse.191  Judicial pressure to settle only strengthens the attorney’s hand by enlisting 
the judge on the side of the settlement.   An initially reluctant client can be more easily 
convinced when the lawyer is able to report that the trial judge favors the settlement and 
even recommends some of its terms. 
Although judicial involvement exposes the settlement process to some outside 
scrutiny, a judge bent on settling a case is not likely to examine the process too closely or 
critically.192  And even one who does scrutinize will face bounded rationality and 
information access obstacles.  For example, since judges usually have little information 
about the nature of an attorney-client relationship early in a case, they are in a poor 
position to manage agency problems effectively even when they are inclined to do so. 
2. A Limited Discretionary Approach to Judicial Involvement 
The bounded rationality, information access, and strategic interaction effects 
discussed in Part IV.B. make it especially difficult for judges to manage the strategic and 
agency costs of settlement promotion on a case-specific basis.  To be sure, similar 
                                                 
190  For the classic treatment of agency costs in settlement, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency 
Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 189 (1987). 
191  These are even more serious problems in those states that apply very liberal standards to determine 
whether clients have delegated settlement authority to their attorneys.  See, e.g., Grace M. Giesel, 
Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney-Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 543, 
555-80 (1999). 
192  This problem is frequently noted in the class action context.  See, e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class 
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 195 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995).  
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problems exist at the trial stage.  But settlement promotion involves more active and 
intimate judicial involvement than trial, and more active involvement is likely to magnify 
the adverse effects.  Moreover, judges will usually have more information at trial and 
certainly greater expertise at handling trials than mediating settlements.  So too 
procedural rules have evolved over time to structure and formalize the trial process in 
ways that manage the potential costs, whereas active settlement promotion is too recent a 
phenomenon to have benefited from a similar evolutionary process.193
Given the risks and potentially serious costs, judges should get involved in 
settlement promotion only when the benefits clearly exceed the costs. This means that the 
current broad scope for discretion should be significantly curtailed.  In particular, 
appropriate methods of settlement promotion should be more frequently prescribed by 
general rule than is the case today.  General rules have substantial advantages over case-
specific discretion in this area.  The formal rulemaking process, as we have seen, has 
built-in features that reduce the adverse effects of cognitive bias, and rulemakers 
deliberate at a distance from the strategic fray of litigation.194  Also, because general 
rules prescribe requirements that apply uniformly to a broad class of cases, they can be 
drafted effectively with information about the average case, which is much easier to 
obtain than information about a specific case.195
ADR referral is an example of a decision currently left for the most part to trial 
judge discretion that might better be handled by general rule.  I endorse the general rule 
 
193  See Molot, Judicial Role, supra note 4 (making a similar point to argue against broad trial judge 
case management).  
194  See supra notes 107-113, 146 & accompanying text. 
195  Rulemakers can rely on past experience and empirical data to infer the relevant characteristics of 
the average case, such as the typical information structure, distribution of bargaining power, and attorney-
client relationship. 
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approach because of the importance of the referral decision and my serious doubts about 
the effectiveness of trial judge discretion, especially given information access and 
strategic interaction obstacles.196  General rules will refer some cases to ADR that should 
not be referred and not refer others that should be, but this is true of a discretionary 
approach as well.  Moreover, by fitting the rule to different categories of cases, the risk of 
error can be reduced.  Finally, as discussed below, the general rule can be drafted to 
allow narrow discretionary exceptions in clear situations. 
For example, there are good reasons to adopt a general rule referring all 
commercial cases involving corporate parties to mediation or some other form of ADR.  
In such cases, there is not likely to be a serious bargaining power imbalance, and 
corporations are in a good position to monitor their attorneys for agency problems.197  At 
the other extreme, ADR referral is probably not a good idea for civil rights cases.  
Settlement does save the cost of going to trial, but active settlement promotion runs the 
risk of high strategic costs and possibly also high agency costs, especially if civil rights 
plaintiffs are prone to frivolous filings and civil rights defendants possess critical private 
information in meritorious suits.  Moreover, civil rights cases tend to involve strong 
claims of moral principle that implicate public as well as private interests and can 
generate expressive value from trial as well as useful precedent.      
Although most settlement promotion methods should be handled by general rule, 
there is some room for case-specific discretion as long as it is narrowly circumscribed.  
The general idea is to confine the judge’s direct involvement to cases where standard 
 
196  See supra notes 136-143 & accompanying text (discussing a mediation referral example). 
197  Asymmetric information, however, is still a potential risk.  Also, given that there is a rich market 
for private ADR, see Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 22, at 1855-1857, it is not clear that a public 
subsidy is warranted through court-annexed ADR, especially for corporate parties capable of contracting 
for the private option.  
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bargaining obstacles, such as mutual optimism, frustrate settlement and where there are 
obvious steps the judge can take to ease the bargaining impasse without producing too 
many other problems. 198  The type of intervention that most clearly fits these 
requirements is for the judge to inform the parties of her tentative views about the merits 
as the case progresses.  Sharing this information can help counteract irrational optimism 
and bring the parties’ estimates of case strength closer together, which makes settlement 
more likely.199  Moreover, this form of intervention is not likely to create serious 
strategic or agency costs, since it is too limited to be of much strategic value to parties or 
their attorneys.200  
Beyond reporting periodic merits evaluations, however, judges should normally 
avoid getting actively involved in settlement promotion.  Of course, the give-and-take of 
litigation requires some flexibility, but my concern is with concerted efforts to promote 
settlement.  Sometimes it might be very clear that more active judicial intervention can 
overcome bargaining obstacles without creating excessive additional costs.  In such 
cases, the judge might be justified in taking additional steps, but only when the value of 
judicial intervention is obviously compelling on cost-benefit grounds.  Moreover, in order 
 
198  See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 
HASTINGS. L. J. 1, 60-78 (1992).  Mutual optimism refers to the situation where both parties are optimistic 
about success. This makes settlement difficult because the plaintiff will demand a large settlement while 
the optimistic defendant will offer only a small one. 
199  In a situation of mutual optimism, one party’s estimate must be wrong, and the judge’s input helps 
to correct the error and align the parties’ trial expectations.  This in turn makes it easier for the parties to 
agree on the trial value of the claim and thus easier for them to settle. 
200  Strategic costs depend on the pressure to settle and minimal intervention is not likely to create 
much pressure.   As for agency costs, an attorney could use the judge’s evaluation to persuade the client to 
accept a settlement, but that might be a good thing if the evaluation is reasonable, and even if it is not, the 
leverage it gives the attorney is much less than for more aggressive forms of judicial intervention.  Also, 
announcing tentative merits evaluations should not impair the legitimacy of the judicial process since 
judges do this sort of thing today in the context of deciding preliminary injunction motions.  See, e.g., 
Lawson Products, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986) (likelihood of success on the 
merits is a preliminary injunction factor). 
Procedural Discretion  Page 67 
 
 
to assure a deliberative decision and check over-reaching, the trial judge should publicly 
explain her reasons for intervening more actively if she decides to do so. 
C.  Channeling Discretion with Factors
So far, we have examined two methods for regulating discretion – a strict rule that 
eliminates as much discretion as possible and a rule that delegates some discretion but 
limits the judge’s options.  A third method, and one that is extremely popular with 
rulemakers today, is to list factors in a rule that the trial judge must balance when making 
a discretionary decision.  Many Federal Rules employ this technique, and appellate courts 
sometimes supply factors for rules that have none.201
There are two major problems with this approach.  First, the efficacy of balancing 
depends on the judge’s ability to acquire and evaluate accurate information about the 
relevant factors, and this is bound to be difficult given bounded rationality, information 
access, and strategic obstacles.  Second, to strike a sound balance, the judge must assign 
weights and compare values across the various factors.202 Without clear principles to 
guide this normative task, the resulting process can easily turn into ad hoc weighing that 
lacks meaningful constraint and jeopardizes principled consistency over the system as a 
whole.203  This is especially true when, as is so often the case, the factors listed in a Rule 
encompass everything conceivably relevant to the decision.204  While a comprehensive 
list of factors might restrain judges from relying on illegitimate considerations, it does 
nothing to constrain judges who act in good faith, at least not without some normative 
direction to guide the balancing process. 
                                                 
201  See supra notes 24-26 & accompanying text. 
202  See Sunstein, supra note 146, at 998-1003 (discussing the problem of value incommensurability). 
203  For a somewhat more optimistic view based on reasoning by analogy, see id. at 963-964, 1000-
1001. 
204  See, e.g., supra note 25 & accompanying text (discussing Rule 19(b)). 
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Thus, multi-factor balancing as a way to channel discretion requires either 
limitations on the factors listed, or normative principles to guide the weighing process – 
or both.  The following section expands on the normative point. 
D.  Guiding Discretion With General Principles
 When broad discretion is desirable (with or without factors), rulemakers should 
guide that discretion by supplying general principles to assist the trial judge in making the 
necessary normative judgments.  Indeed, this fourth method – channeling discretion 
through general principles – is an important adjunct to all types of discretionary 
delegation.205  
To illustrate how principles can help, consider the class action.  There are three 
major challenges facing the class action today: how to correct for asymmetric settlement 
leverage and the related risk of frivolous suits, how to reduce attorney-class and intra-
class conflicts of interest, and how to reconcile individual participation rights with an 
aggregative adjudication device.206  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
relies heavily on trial judge discretion to address these concerns.  The judge, for example, 
is given relatively unguided discretion to decide whether and how to divide a class into 
subclasses, when to send notice to absent class members, what conditions to impose on 
intervenors, which attorney to appoint as class lawyer, and whether to approve a 
settlement.207
                                                 
205  A committee-based rulemaking process is better suited to formulating general procedural 
principles than either a congressional or a common law process. See Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, 
at 940-43. A committee can take the global perspective necessary to design an integrated system of rules 
that distributes error risk fairly and maximizes quality outcomes.  Congress is too political, and trial judges 
too case-focused. 
206  See BONE, ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at  259-298.  
207  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), (c)(4), (d), (e), (g).  Even the 23(a) and (b) certification 
requirements leave a great deal to case-specific discretion.  At the same time, it is important to note that 
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This much reliance on discretion is not optimal.  There is no reason to believe that 
trial judges are well equipped to resolve the complex normative issues or manage the 
details of class action practice on a case-by-case basis without meaningful guidance.  
Sometimes the Committee should resolve issues expressly in the Rule itself.208  Other 
times it is appropriate to leave issues to the discretion of the trial judge to resolve on a 
case-specific basis, but only with guidance from principles set forth in the Rule’s text or 
in the Advisory Committee Note.  To clarify what I have in mind, I will briefly examine 
two especially troubling class action devices: small claim class actions for damages, and 
mass tort class actions.209
1. The Small Claim Class Action Example   
The small claim class action for damages aggregates class members who have too 
little at stake to bring individual suits.210  Examples include securities fraud, antitrust, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
recent amendments to Rule 23 have narrowed the scope of discretion somewhat relative to what it was 
previously.  See Marcus, Slouching, supra note 3, at 1602-1604. 
208  An example is whether the judges can inquire into the substantive merits as part of the certification 
decision.  This issue is part of the larger problem of dealing with frivolous class action litigation. See 
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L. J. 1251, 
1276-80 (2002).  The current rule, which bars a merits inquiry at the certification stage, is largely a creation 
of the Supreme Court, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177  (1974), and to the best of my 
knowledge, has never received a full-scale review from the Advisory Committee.  See 2003 Advisory 
Committee’s Note to Rule 23 (stating in passing that “an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits 
is not properly part of the certification decision” but not justifying the rule).   However, this is just the type 
of issue the Advisory Committee should handle.  The Committee is in a much better position than the 
courts to collect and consider data relevant to the severity of the frivolous class action problem.  See Bone 
& Evans, supra, at 1293-94 (collecting the few empirical studies); Charles A. Silver, “We’re Scared to 
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (questioning claims about a 
frivolous class action problem). Moreover, rulemakers can better consider the difficulties trial judges might 
have assessing frivolousness at an early stage and the relative costs of erroneous certification decisions in 
different types of cases.   See Bone & Evans, supra, at 1302-12.  And they are in a much better position to 
take a global perspective on the issue, evaluating the costs and benefits in relation to other ways the Federal 
Rules handle frivolous suits.   
209  Elsewhere I have described some of the ways that the Advisory Committee might propound 
general principles for small claim and mass tort class actions.  See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: 
Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79, 98-108 (1994). 
210  For a comprehensive analysis of the small claim class action, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
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consumer protection suits.  The class action in this context enables litigation where 
litigation would not otherwise be cost-justified, and it does so by attracting a class 
attorney who can take her fee from the large aggregate class recovery.  The main reason 
to do this is to disgorge the defendant’s unlawful profits and thereby deter similar 
wrongdoing in the future.  Moreover, deterrence is valuable primarily for its public 
benefit – bolstering public confidence in the securities market, preserving competition, or 
protecting consumers as a group – rather than for any specific benefit to individual class 
members.211  To be sure, class members obtain some compensation, but individual 
recovery is usually so small – often a few hundred dollars at most – that compensation 
does very little justificatory work.212  
One fundamental issue that should be addressed at the rulemaking stage – and 
does not appear to have been when Rule 23 was revised to include the small claim class 
in 1966 – has to do with the legitimacy of the device.  Deterrence is a well-accepted goal 
of adjudication, but in ordinary cases deterrence results from a judgment that is meant to 
and does provide significant compensation or other private relief to an individual 
plaintiff.  In the small claim class action, however, individual relief is minimal, merely a 
means to the end of achieving broader deterrence goals.  Hence the legitimacy issue: is it 
is proper to use adjudication exclusively (or even primarily) to deter?  Neither the text of 
Rule 23 nor the Advisory Committee Note addresses this issue directly.213  It is possible, 
I suppose, that the 1966 Advisory Committee discussed the question during its private 
 
211  Many of whom would be unlikely to deal with the defendant again if they had a choice.   
212  But see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 924-25 (1998) (arguing for an entity view of the small claim class action). 
213  See 1966 Advisory Committee Note. 
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deliberations, but I am not aware of any evidence that it did.214  Furthermore, private 
discussions do not furnish public guidance.  
The legitimacy issue has engendered considerable controversy since 1966.215  In 
effect, the class attorney acts as a private attorney general enforcing the substantive law 
for the public benefit.216  The private attorney general is a familiar device in many 
litigation settings.217  Had rulemakers explicitly addressed the legitimacy question in 
1966, they might have developed guiding principles from private attorney general 
practice in more established settings.218  But they never did so.  As a result, individual 
judges are left to fill the normative gap as they decide issues on a case-by-case basis 
interpreting Rule 23 or making common law.  
One (in)famous example is the Supreme Court’s holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, which interpreted Rule 23(c)(2) to mandate individual notice to all class 
members who can be identified with reasonable effort.219  As many others have observed, 
the Court’s interpretation was not mandated by the Rule itself and makes no policy sense 
 
214  For instance, I am not aware of any discussion of this question in the published accounts of the 
1966 Committee’s work by its Reporter, Professor Benjamin Kaplan.  See, e.g. Benjamin A. Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 398 (1967) (observing “for small claims held by small people,” the class action “serves 
something like the function of an administrative proceeding,” but not addressing why adjudication should 
serve such a function). 
215  See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 237-238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J. , 
concurring); Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 167 F.R.D. 523, 529 (1996); Report of the Section of 
Antitrust Law, 110 A.B.A. REP. 905, 906-909 (1985). 
216  See Macey & Miller, supra note 210, at 101. 
217  See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is – And Why It Matters, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669 (1986). 
218  See Bone, Making Process, supra note 31, at 943-45. 
219  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-75 (1974).  This requirement is now codified in 
Rule 23(c)(2)(B).   Eisen relied on Rule 23 for the requirement, but a later case constitutionalized it for 
nonresident class members through due process personal jurisdiction principles. See Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  The constitutional holding is as senseless on policy grounds as the 
Rule 23 holding, at least insofar as small claim class actions are concerned, and clear guidance from the 
Advisory Committee might have convinced the Supreme Court to read the Due Process Clause differently. 
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in the small claim setting, where most class members have too little at stake to even 
bother participating and the additional cost of notice is likely to discourage socially 
beneficial suits.220  Had the rule drafters explained the normative justification for the 
small claim device, Rule 23 might have been drafted better.  Moreover, the Eisen Court 
would have had guidance in sensibly resolving the issues posed by that case.  The 
Advisory Committee Note mentions in passing that individual participation might not be 
practically significant when the stakes are small, but the reference is brief and not linked 
to a more general policy justification for the device.221
More recently, the small claim class action has come under attack for enriching 
class attorneys at the expense of class members.222  This agency problem exists in all 
class actions, but it is thought to be particularly serious in the small claim context because 
class members are much less likely to monitor the class attorney when they have only 
small amounts at stake.223  However, the precise magnitude of the problem in the small 
claim setting is unclear.   One reason has to do with the paucity of empirical data; another 
has to do with lack of normative direction.  
As for empirics, the rulemaking committee is much better situated than the courts 
to initiate empirical studies through the Federal Judicial Center and collect and analyze 
available data.224  As for normative direction, once again it would help if the committee 
 
220  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 210, at 27-33. The 23(c)(2) notice requirement, as 
interpreted by the Eisen Court, increases the cost of filing and thus discourages suits. 
221  The reference in the 1966 Advisory Committee Note appears in the middle of a discussion of the 
(b)(3) factors, where the Committee simply states, without further elaboration, that the interests of class 
members in conducting their own lawsuits might be “theoretic rather than practical” when “the amounts at 
stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable.” 
222  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 210, at 3, 19-27. 
223  Id. 
224  The Federal Judicial Center has already conducted one class action study at the request of the 
Advisory Committee and Judicial Conference.  See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
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clarified the class action’s goals.  For example, critics who complain about agency 
problems tend to assume that the point of a small claim class action is to compensate 
class members for their (small) losses.  If instead the goal is to deter future wrongdoing, 
which is much more sensible, then the attorney is an agent, not of class members, but of 
the public’s interest in deterrence, and any agency problems between the attorney and the 
class should be irrelevant.  Indeed, the attorney’s share of the recovery should be of 
concern only if it affects litigation incentives in a way that impairs the class action’s 
deterrent effect.   Moreover, even if agency costs result in the attorney settling for less 
than the optimal deterrence amount, there still might not be a serious problem if public 
enforcement is available to fill the deterrence gap.225
2. The Mass Tort Class Action Example
Another controversial application of the class action is in the mass tort context.226  
Mass tort class actions aggregate individual damage suits where the damages are large 
enough to justify separate lawsuits.  The goal is not, as in the small claim case, to make 
litigation feasible.  It is instead to save litigation costs, equalize power across the party 
line, and distribute a limited fund fairly among individual claimants.227  
The mass tort class action raises a number of policy issues, but I shall address 
only one here: how to reconcile individual participation rights with aggregate treatment.  
This is arguably a much more serious concern in mass tort than in small claim class 
                                                                                                                                                 
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES (1996).     
225  For example, the Securities Exchange Commission has power to enforce the federal securities 
laws; the Federal Trade Commission has power to enforce the antitrust laws, and federal agencies and state 
attorneys general have power to enforce many of the consumer protection laws.  Moreover, criminal 
penalties are also available in appropriate cases. 
226  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 192. 
227  See BONE, ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at  261-65. 
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actions because the mass tort class action aggregates large individual suits involving 
personal injury, in which the injured party has a much stronger stake in her own lawsuit 
and presumably a stronger interest in participating. 
The Advisory Committee has an important role to play in guiding trial judges as 
they consider the participation issue.  In particular, the Committee should determine, 
based on settled litigation practice and due process precedent, what values the 
participation right serves and how those values can be reconciled with aggregation 
through the class device.  With such guidance, judges would be in a better position to 
decide a number of case-specific issues.  Two examples are whether to certify a 
heterogeneous class228 and how many subclasses to create.229  Significant heterogeneity 
is generally thought to undermine class treatment and trigger stronger individual 
participation demands because it makes the class less cohesive.  And one way to reduce 
heterogeneity is to create subclasses.  
However, the relationship between heterogeneity, certification, and subclassing 
depends on how individual participation is valued.  If the value of participation is 
outcome-based – important because it gives class members the opportunity to influence 
their own case outcomes – the participation right should not make strong demands in the 
class setting as long as other safeguards are in place to assure a reasonably good outcome 
compared to feasible remedial alternatives.  In particular, the most likely alternative to 
the class action is an inventory settlement, which suffers from similar (and possibly 
 
228  Heterogeneity is relevant to Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement and 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
and superiority requirements. 
229  The Supreme Court has held that fairness to absent class members sometimes requires subclassing 
under Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to address intra-class conflicts of interest.  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard  527 U.S. 815, 
856-59 (1999); Amchem Products., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-27 (1997).  The problem with 
subclassing, however, is that it undermines the benefits of class aggregation.  
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worse) problems as the class action.230  It follows that certification of a mass tort class 
action would be justified even with a great deal of intra-class heterogeneity if the class 
device promised greater litigation cost savings or other benefits than an inventory 
settlement.  So too, subclassing would be required only insofar as necessary to ensure an 
outcome superior to the inventory settlement alternative.231
On the other hand, if the value of individual participation is process-based – 
important because it respects the dignity and autonomy of class members by affording 
each an opportunity to control litigation that affects her life profoundly232 – then the 
participation right would be much stronger and intra-class heterogeneity more 
problematic.  The reason is a bit complicated, but the intuition is straightforward.233   The 
class action relies on representation to satisfy participation demands, but it is not clear 
how representation can substitute for personal participation when participation is valued 
on dignitary grounds.  It follows that the class would have to be much more 
homogeneous to support certification, and judges would have to consider subclassing 
 
230  In an inventory settlement, an attorney settles a large group of cases en masse for a total lump sum 
and then decides how to distribute the total among all her clients (after taking her fee).  See Howard M. 
Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in 
Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L. J. 381 (2000); Lynn Baker & Charles Silver, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1470-1478 (1998).  
231  In other words, it is conceivable that a class action could be the best practical option for class 
members even with strong heterogeneity and potentially high agency costs.  See generally Samuel 
Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of 
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1569 (2004) (describing the pervasiveness of informal aggregate 
settlement practices historically and urging consideration of the relative merits of the class action compared 
to likely alternatives). 
232  See generally supra note 85 (distinguishing between outcome-based and process-based theories). 
The dignitary theory of process-based participation differs from an approach that equates participation 
value with psychological benefits, such as assuring feelings of just treatment.  See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1978); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-40, 61-83, 93-127 (1988).  I focus on dignity theory because it is the most 
difficult to square with the class action.  After all, if the value of participation is about feelings or 
perceptions, class aggregation should satisfy participation rights if class members feel at least as good 
about their treatment in the class action as they would in their next best remedial alternative.  
233  For a more rigorous analysis, see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the Day in Court Ideal and 
Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 236-79 (1992). 
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more seriously given the added importance of aligning class representatives with the 
litigating interests of absentees. 
This is not the place to explore these complicated issues in detail.  I have 
discussed some of them in other publications.234  This brief mention is intended only to 
illustrate how normative guidance from rulemakers can channel trial judge discretion in 
useful ways and generate results that are more likely to conform to the policies that the 
rulemakers sought to advance when they adopted the rule.  
It is true that the task I have in mind for the Advisory Committee is more 
burdensome than what committee members are accustomed to doing today, and it is 
bound to introduce more controversy into the rule-making process.  But I see no other 
alternative if we are to have a coherent body of procedural law that distributes the risk of 
decisional error fairly among all litigants, efficiently balances the costs and benefits of 
accurate law enforcement, and respects deeply embedded participation norms.  Either 
rulemakers do this job systematically with an eye to the integrity of the system as a 
whole, or individual judges do it haphazardly on a case-by-case basis. The better choice 
is clear.  
VI. Conclusion
 It is past time to examine procedural discretion critically.   The naïve assumption 
that trial judges have the institutional expertise and experience to exercise discretion well 
ignores serious and unavoidable bounded rationality, information access, and strategic 
interaction obstacles that impair the quality of case-specific decisionmaking.  The fact is 
                                                 
234  See Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process, supra note 84, at 542-550; Robert G. Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 638-650 
(1993); Bone, supra note 233, at 236-279. 
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that rulemakers are often in a better position than trial judges to assess the data and make 
the necessary global judgments in a way that is attentive to settlement as well as 
judgment effects.  Rulemakers are better situated to consider the desirability of stricter 
and more specific rules, and then to craft those rules for different procedural contexts.  So 
too, rulemakers are in an ideal position to offer normative direction to guide trial judge 
discretion where the exercise of that discretion requires difficult normative judgments.   
The challenge is to persuade rulemakers to take on these additional tasks.  In this 
respect, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee has an important role to play.  Normally 
a law professor, the Reporter can assemble the empirical data, present the normative 
arguments, and draft proposals supported by more comprehensive justifications.  The 
Committee can then debate the issues with public input.  As long as the Committee views 
its task as crafting an optimal set of rules rather than catering to the preferences of strong 
interest groups, the result of this process should be an improved procedural system.   
To be sure, hard choices will have to be made, and not everyone will be pleased 
by the results.  But there is no way to avoid hard choices; they are being made now – by 
trial judges in individual cases.  We can and should do better.  
